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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States' "War on Drugs"' has become increasingly
* J.D., University at Buffalo School of Law. The author would like to thank Elizabeth
Dobosiewicz and Daniel Spitzer for their thoughtful and careful work on this Comment.
1. The United States has been waging a "war" on drugs since the early 1970s. In
1973, President Nixon declared war on international drug trafficking, calling it the na-
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international in scope. 2 One consequence of this "internationalization" has been the removal of barriers to anti-narcotics enforcement
efforts.' Legally, the Drug War's growing enforcement emphasis has
prompted revisions in the wording and application of extradition
tion's number one problem. JERALD W. CLOYD, DRUGS AND INFORMATION CONTROL: THE
ROLE OF MEN AND MANIPULATION IN THE CONTROL OF DRUG TRAFFICKING 88 (1982).
2. The preferred strategy of the United States in combatting the international drug
problem has been interdiction. See infra part II. "Interdiction involves efforts to intercept
or deter foreign shipment of illegal narcotics into the United States." Mary E. Welch, The
ExtraterritorialWar on Cocaine: Perspectives From Bolivia and Colombia, 12 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L.J. 39, 42 (1988). However, due to the inadequacy of interdiction efforts, the
United States developed new strategies which focused on the origins of illegal narcotics.
In addition to extradition, discussed infra in part III, these strategies have included the
increased participation by the military in assisting drug law enforcement, both
domestically and internationally; and linking foreign economic assistance in recognized
drug producing and drug transmitting nations with drug control efforts. Id. at 45. For
other examples of the United States offering incentives to foreign countries to gain compliance with United States foreign policy goals, see infra part II.
3. See generally Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Role of the United States in the
InternationalEnforcement of CriminalLaw, 31 HARV. INTL L.J. 37 (1990). Internationalization is an identifiable policy direction in other areas as well. In 1984 and 1986, for
example, Congress passed legislation giving the United States extraterritorial jurisdiction
over certain terrorist crimes committed anywhere in the world. See Aircraft Sabotage Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2187 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 31, 32
(1988)); Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage Taking, Pub. L,
No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2186 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1988));
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, 100
Stat. 896 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1987)).
The Drug War has also effected the scope of individual rights within the United
States. One area in which individual rights have been narrowed is in the Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Florida v. Bostick, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386-88
(1991) (holding the actions of sheriff officers in boarding a bus, questioning defendant,
and conducting a consensual search of defendant's luggage did not constitute a "seizure"
under the Fourth Amendment); Alabama v. White 496 U.S. 325, 328-32 (1990) (holding
that an anonymous telephone tip, corroborated by independent police investigator, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to provide suspicion to make an investigatory stop of
defendant's vehicle); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) (holding that DA's
stop of a person fitting a drug courier profile was reasonable); National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raub, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989) (extending the "special needs"
exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements to include suspicionless drug
testing of employees); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-25 (1984) (adopting a
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983)
(adopting a "totality of the circumstances" approach to probable cause).
Another example of judicial narrowing of Fourth Amendment protections has involved
the granting of "anticipatory" search warrants. See United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699
(2d. Cir.) cert. denied, 493 U.S. 943 (1989); State v. Gutman, 670 P.2d 1166 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1983); State v. Wright, 772 P.2d 250 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989). See Abridged Too Far:
Anticipatory Search Warrantsand the FourthAmendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 781
(1991).
For a scholarly analysis of the retraction of Fourth Amendment protections of individual rights, see Christopher J. Sullivan, First Circuit Extends Fourth Amendment
WarrantException, 7 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 173 (1983).
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treaties.4 Extralegally, it has created a window of opportunity for the
United States government to circumvent diplomatic and legal
obstacles in order to facilitate policy and prosecutorial objectives.'
The policy practice of this brave new world raises important,6
but heretofore largely unaddressed, legal and political questions.
While new enforcement strategies have yielded many positive developments, such as encouraging international cooperation in criminal
matters, they have evolved in disregard for their effects on individual rights.7 The global Drug War, as a balance between policy objec4. See infra note 285 and accompanying text.

5. See, for example, the letter from the Justice Department to the FBI, advising the
FBI that the United States' abduction of foreign nationals from abroad without the permission of the host state was legal. Ronald Ostrow, Baker Vows Full Talks Before FBI
Uses ForeignArrestPowers, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1989, at A16.

United States officials have utilized other quasi-legal methods to gain acquisition
over individuals. Two such methods have been to persuade foreign officials to expel fugitives to the United States and to trick fugitives to fall into United States custody. Because
such methods are less cumbersome than extradition proceedings, United States officials
have resorted to these methods even when extradition is available. See Proceedings of the
HarvardLaw School Conference on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters, 31
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 72 (1990) [Hereinafter Harvard Conference]. For example, during the
1970's, United States drug enforcement agents involved in "Operation Springboard"
worked closely with specially created Latin American police groups to apprehend and
expel about five dozen major drug traffickers without resort to formal extradition
procedures. Id. at 73.
Describing some of the more creative ways to "extradite" foreign nationals, M. Cherif
Bassiouni notes that the practice of disguised extradition:
is a method by which a state uses or relies upon its immigration laws to deny an
alien the privilege of remaining in that state and then, in carrying out the exclusion, expulsion or deportation provisions of such laws against the individual,
it places him directly or indirectly in the control of the agents of another state
who seek him.
M. CHERIF BAsSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 133-34

(1974). Irregular methods of rendition were used to expel Nazi war criminals from the
United States. See BARBARA M. YARNOLD, INTERNATIONAL FUGITIVES: A NEW ROLE FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 67 (1991).

6. Extradition is a part of a wider network of cooperative law enforcement methods.
This network includes Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, which provide for a wide variety
of cooperative law enforcement assistance, including: "providing records, locating persons,
taking the testimony or statements of persons, producing documents, executing requests
for search and seizure, forfeiting criminally-obtained assets, and transferring persons in
custody for testimonial purposes." Bruce Zagaris, Developments in InternationalJudicial
Assistance and Related Matters, 18 DENv. J. INVL L. & POLy 339, 352 (1990). As of 1990
the United States has Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with Switzerland, the
Netherlands, Turkey and Italy. Id. Additionally, there were six proposed Treaties
Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters pending with the Cayman
Islands, Mexico, Canada, Belgium, the Bahamas and Thailand. Id. at 351.
7. Doctrines which constrain individual rights cannot be confined to the often narrow
factual context which gives rise to their use. Stephen Saltzburg notes that
Few constitutional doctrines can be confined to drug cases, and judicial toleration of improper practices thus cannot be reserved for these cases. Once created,
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tives and individual rights, has increasingly become one-sided.8
Under the comforting auspices of cooperation and the claimed common interest in ending illicit narcotics activities, anti-drug efforts
have swung the balance in favor of policy and enforcement objectives
at the expense of individual rights and liberties.
This subordination of individual rights to policy interests is
reflected in United States' extradition and abduction jurisprudence.
Because extradition proceedings are not classified as crimiial trials,
extradition. defendants are afforded few procedural and substantive
protections." Although extradition defendants can challenge extradition on jurisdictional grounds, these challenges have been repeatedly rejected." Courts have uniformly interpreted extradition as a
process which protects state, not individual rights. 2 Courts have
also rejected the constitutional claims of extradition defendants,
finding some constitutional protections inapplicable to extradition
proceedings, and construed others as a function of United States'
diplomatic and policy efforts rather than as an independent set of
protections guaranteed to all persons.
The policy objective/individual rights imbalance is also reflected in the United States' acquisition of foreign defendants. For
over a century, since the Supreme Court decided Ker v. Illinois,13 the
way in which we bring foreign nationals to trial has no bearing on
our ability to try them.'4 The exception to this rule, United States v.
doctrines have a life of their own, so that decisions giving the government an
edge against drug dealers may permit the government to deal with individuals
who have no connection with drugs in ways that would not otherwise be tolerated. Thus liberty denied to those suspected of dealing in drugs is liberty denied
to all.
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (As
Illustratedby the Open FieldsDoctrine),48 U. PITr. L. REV. 1,3 (1986).
8. This theme is currently receiving a lot of scholarly and public attention, see e.g.,
Dwight L. Greene, Abusive Prosecutors: Gender, Race & Class Discretion and the
Prosecutionof Drug-Addicted Mothers, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 737 (1991); Dorothy E. Roberts,
PunishingDrug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality and the Right of
Privacy, 104 HARV.L. REV. 1419 (1991); Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy,
13 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 278 (1990).

9. The phrase "abduction jurisprudence" will be used throughout this Comment to
describe how the courts have dealt with the abduction of foreigners by the United States.
This term is used because challenges to abduction can involve three types of claims: (1) a
claim that an individual's due process rights have been violated; (2) a claim that the abducting country violated a treaty obligation; or (3) the claim that the abduction violated a
nation's sovereignty.
10. See infra part IIIA.
11. See infra part II.A.2.
12. See infra part III.A.2.
13. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
14. Id. at 441.
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Toscanino,5 has been sharply narrowed. 16 In addition to Ker, our
extradition jurisprudence assumes that foreign nations will interpose themselves politically between abusive governmental practices
and an individual whose rights have been violated. 7 This assumption ignores current international realities. First, the United States
is increasingly removing potential individual protections from extradition treaties, thus decreasing the potential bases from which
claims against United States misconduct could be made: 18 Second,
the United States is using other measures, such as threats to cut off
pressure countries into compliance with its foreign policy
aid, to
19
goals.
Several recent decisions may affect the policy interest/individual rights balance. In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
1,20 the Supreme Court overturned a Ninth Circuit decision which
held that a Mexican national's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when his residence was illegally searched by United States
authorities.2 ' While this decision continues the long-standing judi22
cial trend of deferring to the government's foreign policy initiatives
and narrowing the reach and protections of the Fourth
Amendment,' it also takes a further step toward narrowing the
extraterritorial reach of the Constitution.
Next, in United States v. Alvarez-Machain,4 the Supreme
Court ruled that the United States' abduction of a Mexican national
did not violate the extradition treaty between the United States and
Mexico. The Court found that there was nothing in either the Treaty
or general principles of international law which suggested that abduction was not a legitimate means for bringing a person to the
requesting state.'
15. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).

16. Restrictions have occurred even in the Circuit that decided Toscanino. See
United States ex rel Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001
(1975).
17. One underpinning of this assumption is the "state protest" requirement, a pre-

requisite to individual challenges of state conduct under a treaty. See Matta-Ballesteros
v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that individual rights are protected by
the deterrent effect of State protest). See infra part III.B.
18. See infra part III.B.
19. See infra part IV.B.
20. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). For a general discussion of Verdugo-Urquidez I, see Jon A.
Dobson, Note, Verdugo-Urquidez: A Movement Away From Belief in the UniversalPreExistingRights ofAll People, 36 S.D. L. REv. 120 (1991).
21. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 494 U.S.
259 (1990).
22. See infra part IV.A.
23. See supra note 3.
24. 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992).
25. See infrapart IV.C.
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Later the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit decision in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez 11,26 remanding it for reconsideration
under Alvarez-Machain. In Verdugo-Urquidez H the Ninth Circuit
ruled that the United States' collusion with Mexican police in bringing Verdugo-Urquidez to the United States violated the United
States-Mexico extradition treaty, and was grounds for divesting the
United States ofjurisdiction to try him. With this ruling, the Ninth
Circuit had broken from a clear pattern of rejecting the claims of
irregularly apprehended individuals. Specifically holding that treaty
obligations were binding, the Ninth Circuit departed from most
precedent by putting teeth into its role as monitor of governmental
extraterritorial conduct.28
This Comment will analyze two elements of the international
Drug War, extradition and abduction, and analyze the impact of
these practices on individual rights. Part II of the Comment briefly
summarizes the internationalization of the Drug War. Part In describes United States' extradition and "irregular rendition" 21 practices. It illustrates the few protections available to individuals in
extradition proceedings, and describes how these protections are
waning in light of the changing extradition landscape. From this
starting point, it then shows how the United States has tried to
circumvent obstacles in order to further prosecutorial objectives
abroad. Part IV summarizes the Verdugo-Urquidez and AlvarezMachain decisions. Part V analyzes the impact of these decisions on
extradition and abduction jurisprudence and on the individual
rights/policy objective balance. It then suggests that the reasoning
employed in Verdugo-Urquidez H should be used as the beginnings
of a model for sorting out extradition and abduction issues more rationally. Finally, Part VI considers the significance of the elevation
of policy interests over individual rights, both for other states and
individuals.
II. THE INTERNATIONA.ZATION OF THE WAR ON DRUGS
International anti-drug efforts can be traced to the beginning of
the twentieth century. 0 The first recorded initiatives involved bilat26. 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S.Ct. 2986 (1992).
27. 939 F.2d at 1345-49.
28. See infra part IV.B.
29. For the purposes of this Comment, "irregular rendition" practices are any procedures, outside of the formal extradition process, which are utilized to acquire the body of
a person outside of the United States. For another definition of "irregular rendition", see
infra note 63.
30. See generally UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, INTERNATIONAL
CONTROL OF NARCOTIC DRUGS (1965) (discussing the historical background and the
existing system of international narcotics control) [hereinafter UNITED NATIONS].

19931

EXTRADITION AND ABDUCTION

633

eral and multilateral conventions which evidenced a shared commitment to end the drug problem. The earliest form of this commitment involved the regulation of international narcotics traffic. 31
This early anti-drug commitment has continued unabated; the
Drug War is at the forefront of current cooperative international
efforts. 2 Several reasons for this exist: first, the size and impact of
the illegal narcotics industry;3 second, the perception that single
nations cannot respond to the drug trade effectively; 34 and third, the
31. Several important anti-drug conventions have been: Convention at the Hague in
1912 (controlling the production and distribution of opium, limiting use of narcotic drugs
to "legitimate" uses, and subjecting drug manufacturers and traders to a permit and recording system); the Geneva Convention of 1925 (required governments to submit drug
statistics to Permanent Control Opium board; established system of governmental
monitoring of imports and exports); Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in
Dangerous Drugs (called for commitment to preventing drug offenders from escaping for
"technical reasons" and facilitated extradition for drug offenses); The Protocol of 1946
(transferred to the United Nations the functions previously exercised by the League under the various narcotics treaties concluded before World War II); The Paris Protocol of
1948 (authorized the World Health Organization to place under full international control
any new drug which could not be placed under such control by application of the relevant
provisions of the 1932 Convention and which it finds either to be addiction-producing or
convertible into an addiction-producing drug); The Opium Protocol of 1953 (limited the
use of opium and the international trade in it to medical and scientific needs and
eliminates legal overproduction of opium through the indirect method of limiting the
stock of the drug maintained by the individual states; empowers the Permanent Central
Opium Board to employ certain supervisory and enforcement measures); The Single
Convention of 1961 (replaced the existing nine treaties; extended control to the
cultivation of plants from which the "natural" narcotics drugs are obtained; and simplified
the international control machinery); 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 30, at 10.
Currently, the four main United Nations bodies responsible for controlling drugs are:
The UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the UN Division of Narcotic Drugs, the
International Narcotics Control Board; and the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control. See M.
Cherif Bassiouni, CriticalReflections on Internationaland National Control of Drugs, 18
DEN . J. INTL. & POL. 311, 317-18 (1990).
32. See Bassiouni, supra note 31, at 311-16; Faiza Patel, Crime Without Frontiers:A
Proposal for an InternationalNarcotics Court, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 709, 715
(1990) ("The international community's recognition of the dangers of narcotics abuse and
the necessity of controlling the narcotics supply is evidenced by the thirteen multilateral
treaties that have been concluded on the subject of international control of narcotics since
1912.").
33. The international narcotics trade, worth an estimated 500 billion dollars a year,
is second only to the international arms trade in value. Id. at 709. Narcotics trafficking
continues to transcend national borders and concerns. Narcotics are produced and
processed mainly in South Asia and Latin America and are subsequently distributed
throughout the world for resale and individual consumption. Id. at 716.
34. Bruce Zagaris has commented that "[miany countries that lack essential
institutional capabilities, [such as an operative or effective judiciary,] financial resources,
and skilled personnel are not capable of designing and implementing ... strategies for
dealing with narco-terrorism." Bruce Zagaris, Protectingthe Rule of Law FromAssault in
the War Against Drugs and Narco-Terrorism,15 NOVA L. REV. 703, 707 (1991); see gener-
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perceived fusion of the narcotics industry with legitimate foreign
governmental operations, especially in Latin American countries."
The United States plays a leading role in the ongoing conflict, conducting an anti-narcotics war on political and legal fronts that utilizes an array of different methods, ranging from economic incentives
and disincentives to interdiction efforts to military action. 6
ally INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING (D. Rose ed., 1988); Bassiouni, supra note 31, at
318.
Some of the difficulties in mounting an institutional attack on the drug war lie in the
indeterminate nature of illicit narcotics activities. The sources of narco-terrorism and
narco-trafficking are difficult to reduce to a single typology. Illicit drug activities are the
product of a wide range of relationships between situations and groups. A common
denominator between these relationships, however, is the use of terrorism to intimidate
the government, judiciary, police, and military to prevent apprehension, prosecution and
incarceration. Zagaris, supra at 710.
35. See STEPHEN WisoTsKy, BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS 155 (1990). Bolivia, for instance, was taken over by a group of military officers who also dominated the drug trade
in the early 1980s under the Luis Garcia Meza government. See Zagaris, supra note 34, at
708. A similar situation is alleged to have occurred in Panama under deposed President
Manuel Noriega's administration. Id.
36. For example, the United States succeeded in curtailing importation of heroin by
agreeing to provide $35 million in aid to Turkey for that Nation's outright ban on opium
production. Nikolaos Stavrou, The Politics of Opium in Turkey, in DRUGS, POLITICS, AND
DIPLOMACY 220 (R. S. Simons & Abdul A. Said, eds., 1974). For other examples of similar
incentives and disincentives, see infra notes 44, 50, 56 and accompanying text. For a
general account of the ascension of the military in the Drug War see infra notes 40-45
and accompanying text.
An interesting statutory development regarding the control of drugs is the evolution
of the Mansfield Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act. The original amendment
provided that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, no officer or employee of the
United States may engage or participate in any direct police arrest action in any foreign
country with respect to narcotics control efforts." International Security Assistance and
Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-329, § 504, 90 Stat. 764 (current version at
22 U.S.C. § 2291(c) (Supp. 1 1989)).
Two years later the Mansfield Amendments limits on involvement in "police action"
were slightly relaxed with the provision that: "[nlo such officer or employee may
interrogate or be present during the interrogation of any United States person in any foreign country with respect to narcotics control efforts without the written consent of such
person." International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Pub.L.No. 95-384, § 3, 92 Stat. 730
(1978) (emphasis added). In 1986 it was again modified to authorize the Secretary of State
to waive the prohibition on participation by United States officers in a direct police arrest
if he determined that the application of the provision "would be harmful to the national
interests of the United States." International Narcotics Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-570, § 2009, 100 stat 3207-64, (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c)(2) (1988)).
Finally, in 1989 the Mansfield Amendment was revised to permit American officers,
with the approval of the United States chief of mission, to assist or observe foreign officers in effecting an arrest. International Narcotics Control Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101232, § 15, 103 Stat 1954, 1963-64 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2291 (c)(2) (Supp. I. 1989). See
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitutionand International
Law, Continued, 84 AM. J.INT'L. L. 444, 479-80 (1990) (noting that many efforts to repeal
the Mansfield Amendment or deprive it of its force were not successful).
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Major United States involvement in the Drug War began under
the Nixon administration." Calling drug abuse a "national emergency," President Nixon doubled the manpower of. the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and later consolidated enforcement
power in the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).3 5 These efforts were greatly expanded during the Reagan Administration,
most significantly by unifying the executive and legislative branches
and using this broad-based political support to enact many sweeping
anti-drug initiatives.3 9 Under President Reagan the use of the military in counter-narcotics efforts greatly expanded. 40 For example,
the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1982"' authorized
the Department to provide civilian officials with information,
equipment, training and advice.42
37. CLOYD, supra note 1, at 88.
38. WISOTSKY,supra note 35, at 3.
39. President Reagan was quick to lay out his anti-drug campaign. An early Reagan
speech called for (1) more personnel; (2) more aggressive law enforcement - creating 13
regional prosecutorial task forces across the nation; (3) $127.5 million in additional
funding, and a substantial re-allocation of the existing $702.8 million budget away from
prevention, treatment, and research programs to law enforcement programs; (4) the addition of 1,260 beds at eleven federal prisons to accommodate the increase in di-ug offenders
to be incarcerated; (5) more stringent laws; (6) better inter-agency coordination; and (7)
improved federal-state coordination. Id. at 4-5.
40. Id. at 4-5.
41. Pub. L. No. 97-86, title IX, § 905(a)(1), 95 Stat. 1115 (1981) (codified as amended
at 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-373 (1982)).
42. Id. §§ 371-373. Additionally, Wisotsky writes that
Reagan also succeeded in literally militarizing what had previously been a rhetorical war by deploying the military forces of the United States in drug enforcement operations. The Department of Defense (DOD )provided pursuit
planes, helicopters, and other equipment to civilian enforcement agencies, while
Navy "hawkeye" radar planes patrolled the coastal skies in search of smuggling
aircraft and ships. The Coast Guard intensified its customary task of interdicting drug-carrying vessels at sea; and for the first time in American history Navy
ships, including a nuclear-powered anti-aircraft carrier, interdicted-and in one
case fired upon drug-smuggling ships in international waters.
WISOTSKY,supra note 35, at 5-6.
Other legal initiatives gave the branches of the military a greater role in the Drug
War. The 1981 Amendments to the Posse Comitatus Act, for example, authorized a
greater role for both the Army and Air Force. Id. at 92. The Department of Defense also
waived administrative regulations which cramped the enforcement role of the Navy. Id.
at 93.
The Navy then began providing air and surface surveillance of 'suspected drug
trafficking vessels.' It also began carrying Coast Guard detachments on vessels
for 'law enforcement boardings of United States flag and stateless vessels.' To
maintain the fiction of an 'indirect' law enforcement role, the Secretary's directive stipulated that '[t]actical control of Navy vessels will shift to the Coast
Guard prior to any interdiction.' In other words, the Navy ship 'becomes' a
Coast Guard ship during the interdiction.
Id. at 94.
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The International Narcotics Control Act of 1986,11 another
broad Reagan Administration anti-narcotics measure, was clearly
geared toward stepping up the Drug War abroad. It authorized
withholding assistance to drug producing and transit nations,4 4 further recognized the increased role for the military in domestic and
overseas enforcement of American drug laws, 45 and sanctioned and
46
encouraged the negotiation of effective extradition treaties.
A third Reagan Administration anti-drug initiative was the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.' 7 This Act: (1) strengthened the
reporting and monitoring requirements by financial institutions;4 8
(2) ordered the Department of the Treasury to attempt to create an
international currency control agency, to assist enacting uniform
money laundering laws, and to collect and analyze the currency
transaction reports; 49 (3) expanded information sharing practices
with other countries and called for sanctions of countries not
complying with such practices; 0 (4) agreed to create a model
extradition statute and a model mutual legal assistance treaty;5 ' and
52
(5) called for the creation of an international drug force.
Like the Nixon and Reagan Administrations, the Bush
Administration also favored law enforcement over individual treatment.53 This enforcement preference was reflected in the Bush
43. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 2005, 100 Stat. 3207, 3261-63 (1986) (codified as amended
at 22 U.S.C. § 2291 (Supp. V 1987)).
44. Id § 2008, 100 Stat. at 3264 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2291(e)(3)),
which provides that a determination of a nation's eligibility for foreign assistance shall
include:
[a] discussion of the extent to which such country has cooperated with the
United States narcotics control efforts through the extradition or prosecution of
drug traffickers, and, where appropriate, a description of the status of negotiations with such country to negotiate a new or updated treaty relating to narcotics offenses.
45. National Drug Interdiction Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 3002,
100 Stat at 3207, 73 (1986) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. V 1987)).
46. Id. § 2008, 100 Stat. at 3264.
47. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (1988).
48. Bruce Zagaris, Developments in International Judicial Assistance and Related
Matters, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L. 339, 400 (1990).
49. Id. at 340.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. The Reagan Administration's anti-narcotics initiative included some use of multinational forces, such as "Operation Blast Furnace," the United States and Bolivia's attempt to cocaine laboratories hidden in Bolivia. Jaime Malamud-Goti, Soldiers, Peasants,
Politiciansand the War on Drugs in Bolivia, 6 Ail. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 35,41 (1991).
53. See American Interests: 'A Drug War Scorecard with Robert Martinez," Federal
News Serv., Sep. 6, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File [hereinafter
American Interests]. President Bush's anti-drug strategy had three components. First was
demand reduction, which involves education programs and related efforts, such as drug
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Administration's "Andean" initiative, an agreement between the
United States and Latin American countries to move the Drug War
into the back yards of the drug traffickers themselves.54
The changing character of the Drug War did not alter the Bush
Administration's enforcement commitment. As the war has physically expanded, drug traffickers have relocated to different parts of
Latin America, such as Peru. 5 President Bush responded to this
change in the drug-trafficking topography by vigorously funding
Peruvian anti-drug efforts.5" A second change in the drug trafficking
climate was Colombia's decision to amend its Constitution to prevent extradition.57 The political mileage Columbia gleaned from this
decision, in its bargaining with drug kingpins, has led other countries to consider similar policy measures.58 The response to this has
more flexibility, more funds, and more enforcebeen predictable:
59
ment.

From Presidents Nixon to Bush the global Drug War increasingly focused on enforcement to cut the supply of narcotics off at its
source. Politically, this emphasis lead to an increased use of the
military in anti-narcotics efforts, increased involvement with the
anti-narcotics policies of foreign nations, and the physical expansion
treatment and workplace, with an estimated cost of $3 billion. Id. The second component
was domestic law enforcement, which involves finding, arresting and punishing users, at
a cost of $5 billion. Id. The third component involved border control and international
initiatives, at a cost of $3 billion. Id.
At this writing it is too soon to tell what the drug control policy of the Clinton
Administration will be.
54. At the 1990 anti-narcotics summit, President Bush outlined his Andean strategy,
a five-year, $2.2 billion strategy aimed at destroying the growing, processing and
transportation of coca and coca products in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. The measure also
provided about $800 million over 5 years in military aid to these countries. Elizabeth
Neuffer, In Drug Fight, a Battle Over Bush Strategy, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 27, 1992,
National/Foreign, at 1.
55. American Interests, supra note 53.
56. This money was transferred despite Peru's questionable human rights record.
Although there was evidence of "serious human rights abuses," the State Department certified that there was "no consistent pattern" of human rights violations which would have
made Peru ineligible to receive foreign aid. Id. Thirty-five million dollars was transferred
to Peru, accompanied by United States Green Berets, for the training of Peruvian
military anti-drug teams. Id. This development is troubling because American extradition
jurisprudence assumes that the United States will not make treaties with countries
which have questionable human rights records. See Ahmad v. Wigen, discussed infra at
note 129 and accompanying text.
57. American Interests, supra note 53.
58.Id.
59. See American Interests, supra note 53. See also Drug-War Cooperation,
CHRisTIAN Sc. MONITOR, Aug. 5, 1991, at 20 (discussing increase in U.S. funding of

Columbian justice system following decision to try drug traffickers in Columbia rather
than extradite them to the U.S.).
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of the war into Latin America itself. Legally, this emphasis shifted
the focus to what has been perceived as one of the largest obstacles
to the enforcement front in the Drug War-the difficulty'in bringing
suspected narcotics felons to trial.6 0
III. UNITED STATES ExTRADITION AND ABDUCTION PRACTICE

A.

SurrenderingFugitives to Foreign Countries

Efforts to bring drug offenders to trial range from extradition to
forms of irregular rendition to abduction." Extradition,6 2 traditionally the most typical of these methods, is the "surrender by one state
or country to another of an individual accused or convicted of an
offense outside its own territory and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to review and punish him,
demands his surrender."63
The procedural and substantive elements of the extradition
process are outlined in treaties' and statutes.6 5 The right to request
60. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
61. See infra part III.B.
62. According to Bassiouni
[tihe history of extradition can be divided into four periods: (1) ancient times to
the seventeenth century-a period revealing almost exclusive concern for political and religious offenders; (2) the eighteenth century and half of the nineteenth
century-a period of treaty-making chiefly concerned with military offenders
characterizing the condition of Europe during that period; (3) from 1833 to present-a period of collective concern in suppressing common criminality, and (4)
post 1948 developments which ushered a greater concern for protecting the human rights of persons and reveals an awareness of the need to have international due process of law to regulate international relations.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 4-5 (footnote omitted).
63. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 526 (5th ed. 1979). See Barbara Sicaledes, Comment,
RICO, CCE, and International Extradition, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 1281, 1290 (1989). In
addition to the ways listed in note 6, supra, there are other ways to obtain the body of a
person besides extradition. Quasi-extradition, for example, is "any procedure that allows
an individual to be punished in one jurisdiction for an offense committed in another or
that facilitates a criminal investigation by giving a court access to evidence within the
territorial jurisdiction of another State." William V. Dunlap, Dual Criminality in Penal
Transfer Treaties,29 VA. J. INT'L L. 813, 837 (1989). Quasi-extradition, as opposed to routine extradition, "does not entail the physical surrender of the defendant to the
jurisdiction of the State of offense." Id. Irregular rendition, another way of obtaining the
body of a person without extradition, involves informal, ad hoc agreements between apprehending and holding states to secure the rendition of the alleged offender with the assistance or acquiescence of the holding state. See J. Richard Barnett, Note, Extradition
Treaty Improvements to CombatDrug Trafficking, 15 GA. J. INTL. & COMP. L. 285, 301-04
(1985). Finally, a nation can resort to abduction, or kidnapping of foreign nationals, to acquire the body of a person without extradition. Abduction occurs when "agents of the apprehending nation [unilaterally seize a fugitive] without the cooperation of the
government in which the fugitive is located." Id. at 301.
64. Bilateral treaties constitute the main basis of international practice. BASSIOUNI,
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an individual's extradition is created by treaty.6 There is no obligation to extradite an individual under international law without a
treaty between the requested and the requesting state, 67 a notion
which American courts follow today.'
supra note 5, at 14. In addition, some countries are parties to multilateral treaties. These
take the form of either a convention on extradition which replaces, supplements, or complements bilateral treaties, like the European Extradition Convention, or a"convention in
which states agree to adopt reciprocal national legislation modelled on an agreed pattern,
such as among the member states of the British Commonwealth. Id. at 19.
65. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3195 (1988). The primary international extradition provision is
§ 3184, which provides:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United
States and any foreign government, anyjustice or judge of the United States, or
any magistrate authorized so to do by a court of the United States, or any judge
of a court of record of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint
made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the
crimes provided for by such treaty of convention, issue his warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged, that he may be brought before such justice,
judge, or magistrate, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard
and considered.... If, on such hearing, he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention, he shall
certify the same, together with a copy of all the testimony taken before him, to
the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of the
proper authorities of such foreign government, for the surrender of such person,
according to the stipulations of the treaty or convention; and he shall issue his
warrant for the commitment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there to
remain until such surrender shall be made.
66. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
67. David Bernstein, InternationalCourt of Justice-Case concerning Military and
ParamilitaryActivities in andAgainst Nicaragua(Nicaragua v. United States), 28 HARV.
INT'L L. J. 146 (1987). See also Quinn, 783 F.2d at 782. A treaty is an "agreement, league,
or contract between two or more nations or sovereigns, formally signed by commissioners
properly authorized, and solemnly ratified by the several sovereigns or the supreme
power of each state." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1502 (6th ed. 1990). As Geoff Gilbert

notes, however, some "civil law states, such as France and Switzerland, statutorily
provide for extradition when no treaty exists." GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION
LAW 26 (1991).
International extradition is exclusively a power of the Federal Government. This
power is justified under the argument that, as an exclusively treaty-founded process, extradition is a matter of foreign affairs which is within the enumerated powers of the federal government and specifically vested in the president. In the absence of a treaty there
is no duty to extradite. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933). Yet nations
can, if they wish, extradite an individual without a treaty. See James Brooke, War Report
From Columbia: Fight Will be Long, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1989, at A12 (describing the
extradition of accused traffickers from Columbia without a treaty). For a discussion challenging the authority of the President in treaty matters see DAvID GRAY ADLER, THE.
CONSTITUTION AND THE TERMINATION OF TREATIES (Harold Hyman & Stuart Bruchey
eds., 1986).
68. Some changes regarding extradition and international anti-narcotics initiatives
were incorporated in the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 19, 1988, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 82/15, U.N. Sales
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The United States has over 100 extradition treaties in force.69
Extradition treaties are customarily composed of several elements,
which define their scope and procedural requirements. 17 To extradite
an individual from the United States, a requesting nation must file
a verified complaint with the United States government. 71 An extradition judge or magistrate then issues a warrant for the accused's
arrest, after which a hearing is held to determine whether the requesting nation has established probable cause for extradition. 72 The
extradition hearing has two major functions. First, the reviewing
court determines whether the extradition request is in compliance
with the applicable extradition treaty. 3 Second, the court decides
whether there is sufficient evidence to surrender the accused to the
requesting nation. 74 If the accused is declared extraditable, the judge
or magistrate orders his detention and certifies the evidence to the
Secretary of State, who makes the final decision to extradite; if not
surrendered to the requesting country within two months of the
No. E.91.XI.6 (1991), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989). The Convention (1) provides that
certain offenses shall be extraditable regardless of whether or not they are included in an
extradition treaty; (2) explicitly recognizes that narcotics-related money laundering, a
new category of offenses for many states, is an extraditable offense; (3) provides that requested states may refuse to comply with extradition requests when there are substantial
grounds to believe that ompliance would facilitate prosecution of a person on account of
his race, religion, nationality or political opinions. However, extradition requests may not
be refused under the Convention on the grounds that they involve 'fiscal', 'political', or
'politically motivated' offenses. See David P. Stewart, Internationalizing the War on
Drugs: The UN Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in NarcoticDrugs and Psychotropic

Substances, 18 DENy. J. INTIL L. & POLY 387, 397-98 (1990). This constitutes an attack on
the political offense exception. For a discussion of exceptions to extradition treaties and
criticisms of those exceptions, see infra note 287 and accompanying text.
69. For a listing of bi-lateral and multilateral extradition treaties to which the
United States is a party, see 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1988).
70. Typically, extradition treaties include (1) a list of extraditable offenses; (2) a list
of circumstances in which extradition is to be prohibited; (3) general procedural
guidelines, including required supporting documentation (e.g., description of the accused,
statement of facts, text of applicable laws, warrant for arrest issued by judicial officer of
the requesting state, evidence justifying arrest and committal); (4) a provision for
"provisional" arrest, which allows for arrest of the accused, prior to receipt by the
requested state of supporting documentation, if there is a high risk that the accused will
soon flee. See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Can., 27 U.S.T. 983; see generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, InternationalExtradition:A Summary of the Contemporary
American Practice and a Proposed Formula, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 733, 739-50 (1969).
Treaties are, however, "generally silent as to the designation of organs competent to handle extradition proceedings." BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 504.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. The latter requirement is satisfied when the requesting governments demonstrates that there is probable cause to believe that the accused committed the alleged offense or that the accused has been convicted of the offense in the requesting nation, Id.
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commitment order, the accused may be released.75
1. The Absence of ProceduralProtections. Individuals facing
extradition proceedings have few rights. Although a defendant can
appeal an extradition order, the scope of appellate review is narrow.
The only way to review an extradition order is by a writ of habeas
76
corpus proceeding; there is no statutory provision for direct appeal.
The scope of habeas corpus review is also limited. In Fernandez
v. Phillips,77 Justice Holmes wrote:
[habeas corpus review] is not a means for rehearing what the magistrate

has already decided. The alleged fugitive from justice has had his hearing
and habeascorpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had
jurisdiction, whether the offence charged is within the treaty78 and, by a
somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting
the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused
79
guilty.

75. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184, 3186, 3188.
76. Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369 (1920) ("proceeding before a committing magistrate in international extradition is not subject to correction by appeal"). For an
argument for direct appellate review in extradition proceedings, see Kevin S. Rosen,
Toward DirectAppellate Review in United States ExtraditionProcedures, 25 COLuM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 433 (1987).
77. 268 U.S. 311 (1925).
78. Language of treaties, both at the extradition hearing and in habeas corpus review are given "liberal" construction. The Supreme Court, for example, in Factor v.
Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933), held that
[iln choosing between conflicting interpretations of a treaty obligation, a narrow
and restricted construction is to be avoided as not consonant with the principles
deemed controlling in the interpretation of international agreements.
Considerations which should govern the diplomatic relations between nations,
and the good faith of treaties, as well, require that their obligations should be
liberally construed so as to effect the apparent intention of the parties to secure
equality and reciprocity between them.
79. Fernandez, 268 U.S. 311, 312. In Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 509 (1896), the
Court wrote:
Whether an extraditable crime has been committed is a question of mixed law
and fact, but chiefly of fact, and the judgment of the magistrate rendered in
good faith on legal evidence that the accused is guilty of the act charged, and
that it constitutes an extraditable crime, cannot be reviewed on the weight of
the evidence, and is final for the purposes o the preliminary examination unless
palpably erroneous in law.
But Abmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) noted that "[i]n practice,
however, habeas review in extradition cases has been somewhat broader than Justice
Holmes suggested should be the case." Id. at 396. See also Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360,
1369 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932 (1978) ("[T]he 'victim' of an extradition
generally gets a pretty broad review under habeas corpus, notwithstanding preachments
that it is extremely limited."). For example, habeas corpus review has also been expanded
to include examination of procedural defects in the extradition process that are of
constitutional magnitude, and of the constitutionality of the executive branch's conduct in
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The characterization of extradition hearings further insulates
them from searching appellate review. Courts repeatedly have emphasized that extradition hearings are not criminal trials and that
rules of criminal procedure are inapplicable. 8 The Federal Rules of
Evidence also do not apply to extradition proceedings. 81 Because
extradition is not classified as a criminal trial, the defendant's possible defenses in extradition proceedings are limited. A defendant
cannot contradict the requesting country's proof or pose questions of
credibility; he can only offer evidence which explains or clarifies the
proof levied against him.8 2 The defendant may not introduce evidence to establish an alibi or raise insanity as a defense to charges
levied against him.8'
Although there is no explicit statutory right to discovery, the
extraditing court has the power to order discovery procedures as
deciding to extradite the accused. See In re Extradition of Burt, 737 F.2d. 1477, 1484 (7th
Cir. 1984); Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 347-49 (4th Cir. 1983).
80. Courts have made it clear that an extradition hearing is "not the occasion for an
adjudication of guilt or innocence." Melia v. United States, 667 F.2d 300, 302 (2d Cir.
1981). The evidentiary rules of criminal litigation are not applicable. Id.; Simmons v.
Bran, 627 F.2d 635, 636 (2d Cir. 1980); FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(b)(5); FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3).
It is widely accepted today, for the simple reason that the extradition proceeding is not a
trial of guilt or innocence, that extradition and criminal proceedings are inherently different. See Jiminez v. Aristequieta, 311 F.2d 547, 556 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
914 (1963); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 900 (2d Cir. 1973), In enforcing an
extradition treaty, "the ordinary technicalities of criminal proceedings are applicable only
to a limited extent," Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 184 (1902), and "form is not to be
insisted upon beyond the requirement of safety and justice," Fernandez, 268 U.S. at 312.
Consequently, the requesting nation is given an advantage over the party seeking to
block extradition, an advantage "most uncommon to ordinary civil and criminal
litigation." First Natl City Bank of N.Y. v. Aristeguieta, 287 F.2d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 1960),
vacated as moot, 375 U.S. 49 (1963).
81. In re Sindona, 584 F. Supp 1437, 1446 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). Additionally, a review by
a magistrate is all that is required in an extradition hearing. Ward v. Rutherford, 921
F.2d 286, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Judge or magistrates also do not normally need to recuse themselves from habeas
corpus proceedings. Oen Yin-Choy v. Robinson, 858 F.2d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir. 1988)
("judge who presides over an extradition hearing need not-recuse and may hear a habeas
corpus action"), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989). See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d
571, 577 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); David v. Attorney General,
699 F.2d 411, 416-17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 832 (1983). A judge's alleged bias, in
order to be disqualifying, must emanate from some extrajudicial source rather than from
participation in judicial proceedings. United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583
(1966).
82. Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 905 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884
(1973).
83. First Natl City Bank of N.Y. v. Aristeguieta, 287 F.2d 219, 226-27 (2d Cir. 1960),
vacated as moot, 375 U.S. 49 (1963); United States ex rel Petrushansky v. Marasco, 325
F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964); Romeo v. Roache, 820 F.2d
540 (1st Cir. 1987).
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"law and justice require."' This power, however, is limited, and has
been sparingly exercised by the courts. In Emami v. U.S. Dist.
86
Court for Northern Dist. of California,
the court stated that "[iln
exercising its discretion to grant or deny discovery, an extraditing
court should consider that 'extradition proceedings should not be
converted into a dress rehearsal for trial' and 'whether the resolution of the contested issue would be appreciably advanced by the
requested discovery."8
These procedural limitations are amplified by statutory disadvantages. Extradition law8 permits the requesting country to introduce evidence ex parte in the requesting country, while those same
ex parte opportunities are unavailable to the accused. 89 Additionally,
the requesting country need not set forth the crime for which the
fugitive was indicted with any particularity or produce an authentic
copy of the arrest warrant." Further, courts have found that the
"wrongful exclusion of specific pieces of evidence does not render the
detention illegal."9 1 Finally, some countries, including the United
States, may refuse to stay extradition, even in the event of otherwise
impermissible procedural deficiencies, if the requesting nation has
"sufficient safeguards" in place.9 2
Extradition orders can also be challenged on the grounds that
84. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 817 n.41. (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
882 (1986).
85. Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 377 F.Supp. 34, 37 (S.D.N.Y 1974), affd, 536 F.2d 478, 484
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976).
86. 834 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1987).
87. Emami, 834 F.2d at 1452 (quoting Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 817 n.41
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986)). Other discovery requests have also been denied. In In re Extradition of Singh, 123 F.R.D. 108 (D.N.J. 1987), the court denied the defendant's deposition request for three reasons. First, Singh's request was no more than a
blanket discovery request, inconsistent with the limited purpose of an extradition
proceeding. Second, the Singh's request would impermissibly convert the hearing into a
full trial. Finally, there was nothing to suggest that granting Singh's deposition request
"would produce explanatory evidence." Id. at 117.
In part, courts have justified the unwillingness to grant discovery motions under the
rationale that Congress, through 18 U.S.C. § 3191 (1992), has "provided a means by
which defendants in extradition proceedings may secure evidence." Singh at 115. The
Supreme Court has held that the purpose of this section is "to afford the defendant the
means for obtaining the testimony of witnesses and to provide for their fees." Charlton v.
Kelly, 229 U.S. 447,458 (1913).
Courts have also denied requests for cross examination. See Oen Yin-Choy v.
Robinson, 858 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 3190 (1988).
89. Id.
90. Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 188-91 (1902).
91. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316 (1922); see United States ex rel Hughes v.
Gault, 271 U.S. 142, 151 (1926).
92. See, e.g., Magisano v. Locke, 545 F.2d 1228, 1230 (9th Cir. 1976).
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probable cause that the accused committed the crime in question
was not shown.3 This challenge is also narrow; the reviewing court
only examines "whether there was any evidence warranting the
finding that there was a reasonable ground to believe the accused
guilty."9 The scope of review is limited to determining whether
there was persuasive evidence of guilt:95
To establish the level of probable cause necessary to certify one for extradition, evidence must be produced that is 'sufficient to cause a person of
ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable
belief of the accused's guilt.' The primary source of evidence of the probable cause determination is the extradition request and any evidence is
deemed truthful for purposes of this determination.9
Although pre-hearing liberty is constitutionally recognized as
an important individual right,9 an arrestee in an extradition proceeding has no statutory right to pre-hearing release.9" Bail is ordinarily not granted in cases of foreign extradition;99 the Supreme
93. See Theron v. United States Marshal, 832 F.2d 492, 495 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).
94. Id. at 495.
95. See Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478
F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1973); see also Eain v. Wilkes, 641
F.2d 504, 509 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Koskotas v. Roche, 740 F. Supp.
904, 913 (D. Mass. 1990) ("review of the evidence before a magistrate has been limited to
a determination that there was competent evidence supporting the finding of extraditability."). Additionally some courts have held that the magistrate's probable cause finding
must be upheld if there is any competent evidence ... to support it." Quinn v. Robinson,
783 F.2d 776, 791 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986) (emphasis added). The
"probable cause" standard is interpreted to mean that probable cause determinations
must fail if there is "any evidence of probable cause." Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354,
1355-56 (9th Cir. 1986).
Other evidentiary procedures favor the prosecution. Accomplice testimony, for
example, is sufficient even without corroboration to demonstrate probable cause to certify
the accused for extradition. Eain, 641 F.2d. at 510 & n.5. Where accomplice testimony is
corroborated by other reliable evidence, it will a fortiori, support a finding of probable
cause. Id. at 510.
96. Ahrnad" v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp 389, 399 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting Coleman v.
Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
97. United States ex rel Goodman v. Kohl, 456 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1972). Additionally,
the Eight Amendment to the United States Constitution reads: "[eixcessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

98. There have been several unsuccessful Congressional attempts to codify a bail
standard for international extradition cases. See H.R. REP. NO. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
7(1984).
99. Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 63 (1903). "In extradition proceedings the presumption is against ball because of the nation's foreign relations interest in successfully
producing extradited persons." United States v. Messina, 566 F. Supp. 740, 742 (E.D.N.Y.
1983). But see Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 430 F. Supp. 915, 916 & n.2 (D. Mass. 1977) (noting
that the "granting of ball pending completion of the extradition proceeding has been the
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Court has said that release may be granted only when the accused
can show the presence of "special circumstances." 0 0
2. Challenges To Jurisdiction: Double Criminality and
Specialty. Extradition proceedings can be challenged by defendants
on jurisdictional grounds. These challenges, consistent with the
narrow procedural protections extradition defendants are accorded,
have been limited by the courts. Theoretically, while procedural
protections have been denied to extradition defendants because of
extradition's non-criminal classification, jurisdictional challenges to
extradition orders have been denied because the basis of these
claims are construed as protecting international relations, not individual rights.
The double, or dual, criminality requirement, for example, demands that in order for an individual to be extradited for an offense,
both countries in an extradition proceeding must recognize the offense as criminal.' 0 ' The Supreme Court has not interpreted the doctrine of "double criminality" to require exact offense congruity; this
broad interpretation favors extradition:
The law does not require that the name by which the crime is described in
the two countries be the same; nor that the scope of liability shall be coextensive, or, in other respects, the same in the two countries. It is enough if
02
the act charged is criminal in both jurisdictions.'

rule rather than the exception").
100. "Special circumstances" have been limited to situations where
the justification is pressing as well as plain,... or in the most pressing circumstances, and when the requirements of justice are absolutely peremptory.... Such circumstances may include a delayed extradition hearing,... and
the need of the defendant to consult with his attorney in a civil action upon
which his 'whole fortune' depends.... In contrast, the discomfiture of
jail, ... and even applicant's arguable acceptance of a tolerable bail risk.., are
not special circumstances.
United States v. Williams, 611 F. 2d 914, 915 (1st Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).
The same standard is applied to pre and post-extradition bail requests. In Wright v.
Henkel, 190 U:S. 40, 62 (1903), the Supreme Court decided a pre-hearing bail request by
analyzing factors relevant to a post-hearing request and concluded that "the same reasons
which induced the language used in the statute [arguing against bail after the extradition
hearing] would seem generally applicable to release pending examination."
101. See generally Sharon A. Williams, The Double Criminality Rule and
Extradition, 15 NOVA L. REV. 581 (1991); David Levy, Note, Double Criminalityand the
U.S.-U.K Extradition Treaty: Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 8 BROOK J. INT'L L. 475 (1982).
102. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 312 (1922). See also United States v. Steckinger,
269 F.2d 681, 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 913 (1959) (finding that it is
"immaterial that the acts in question constitute the crime of theft and fraud in Canada
and the crime of larceny in New York State. It is enough if the particular acts charged are
criminal in both jurisdictions.").
In United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the court held that dou-
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Double criminality, despite its ability to proscribe general state
practices which one party to an extradition proceeding does not approve, has been restricted to analyzing only the criminal posture of
two states regarding a certain offense. Double criminality cannot
prevent extradition if a defense is not "available in the requested
state that would not be available in the requesting state, or 3[if]
" 10
different requirements of proof are applicable in the two states.
Because of their nature, extradition cannot be barred for some
crimes by the double criminality doctrine regardless of the criminal
perspectives of the involved states. In Demjanjuk 'v. Petrovsky,0 4
addressing the extradition of an alleged war criminal, the court
explained that "some crimes are so universally condemned that the
perpetrators are the enemies of all people... any nation which has
custody of the perpetrators may punish them according to its law
applicable to such offenses."0 5
Another potential defense in extradition proceedings is the
specialty doctrine, which prohibits a requesting country from prosecuting an individual for crimes beyond those for which extradition is
granted. 0 6 Like double criminality, judicial interpretations of specialty have safeguarded international relations rather than individual rights.'
United States v. Jetter °5 held that in determining
whether the specialty principle has been abrogated in a given instance, courts only inquire "whether the surrendering state would
regard the prosecution of the issue as a breach," not whether or not
ble criminality does not require the criminal laws of the requested and requesting state to
be "perfectly congru[ous]." See Oen Yin-Choy v. Robinson, 858 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1987);
In re Extradition of Russell, 789 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Suarez-Meson, 694
F.Supp. 676 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 476, cmt. d (1986).
104. 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1985).
105. Id. at 582. Additionally, an asylum country may consent to extradite a defendant for offenses other than those enumerated in an extradition treaty. United States v.
Thirion, 813 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1987).
For a general discussion of the Demjanjuk case, see Rena Hozore Reiss, The
Extradition of John Demjanjuk: War Crimes, Universality Jurisdiction,and the Political
Offense Doctrine, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 281 (1987).
106. Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 905 (2d. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884
(1973).
For general discussions of the specialty doctrine, see Christopher J. Morvillo,
Individual Rights and the Doctrine of Specialty: The Deteriorationof United States U.
Rauscher, 14 FORDHAII INTL L.J. 987 (1991); David Runtz, The Principle of Specialty: A
BifurcatedAnalysis of the Rights of the Accused, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 407 (1991).
107. United States v. Molina-Chacon, 627 F. Supp. 1253 (E.D.N.Y.), affd in part sub
nom. United States v. DiTommasso, 817 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Riviere,

924 F.2d 1289 (3d Cir. 1991).
108. 722 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1983).
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the charge fell outside the letter of the extradition treaty.'
The potential reach of the specialty doctrine has been restricted
in other ways. In Demjanjuk,11 for example, the court noted that
"It]he principle of specialty does not impose any limitation on the
particulars of the charge so long as it encompasses only the offense
for which extradition was granted.""' The court determined that
Demjanjuk's murder charge was, under the Treaty, inclusive of
crimes against Jewish persons and war crimes."'
3. The Absence of Constitutional Protections. In addition to
narrowing procedural protections, and sharply limiting doctrinal
challenges, courts have also been unreceptive to constitutional challenges in extradition proceedings. In In re Extradition of Burt,"1
Burt argued that his due process rights were violated by the United
States when it attempted to extradite him to West Germany fifteen
years after first deciding not to prosecute or extradite him."4 Burt
also asserted that the extradition deprived him of his rights under
both Sixth Amendment of the Constitution and Article VII of the
NATO-SOFA Treaty."5
The court first acknowledged that aliens are entitled to some
procedural due process rights in extradition hearings, and that habeas corpus petitions were the appropriate means of enforcing those
rights."6 Next, the court noted that Fernandez's narrow scope of
review applied to challenges to the magistrate's findings, but not "on
constitutional grounds, [to] the conduct of the executive branch in
deciding to extradite the accused.""7 The United States government
must "conform its conduct to the requirements of the Constitution,"" 8 and although a treaty is the "supreme law of the land,...
109. Id. at 373.
110. 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
111. Id. at 583.
112. Also, the protections provided by the specialty doctrine do not extend to crimes
committed subsequent to the accused's extradition. See Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502
(1915); Collins v. ONeil, 214 U.S. 113 (1909).
113. 737 F.2d 1477 (7th Cir. 1984).
114. Id. at 1482.
115. Id. Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the
Status of their Forces, June 19, 1951, art. 7, 4 U.S.T. 1792, (entered into force Aug. 23,
1953).
116. Burt, 737 F.2d at 1485. The First Circuit has recognized "that serious due process concerns may merit review beyond the narrow scope of inquiry in extradition
proceedings." In re Extradition of Manzi, 888 F.2d 204, 206 (1st Cir. 1989). However, to
warrant review, the petitioner must raise "fundamental issues of substantive or
procedural due process." Id. at 206.
117. Burt, 737 F.2d at 1483.
118. Id. at 1484. See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (plurality opinion)
(noting that the United States government is "entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its
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when in direct conflict, [it] must yield to the Constitution."'
Despite recognizing its obligation to conduct a searching inquiry into its constitutional appropriateness, the court granted the
extradition, holding that
while it may be fundamentally unfair for the government as enforcer of its
criminal statutes to compel an accused to respond to and stand trial for
charges when the government's delay in bringing the charges has resulted
in actual prejudice to the accused, we do not believe that the government
necessarily acts unfairly when as extraditer it makes decisions responsive
ability to
to diplomatic concerns that may secondarily affect the 12accused's
0
respond to criminal charges brought by a foreign state.

The court held that requiring the government to consider121actual prejudice would "distort the aims of the diplomatic effort." It
concluded:
so long as the United States has not breached a specific promise to an accused regarding his or her extradition, and bases its extradition decisions
on diplomatic considerations without regard to such constitutionally impermissible factors as race, color, sex, national origin, religion or political
beliefs, and in accordance with such other exceptional constitutional limitations as may exist because of particularly atrocious procedures or punby the foreign jurisdiction, those decisions will not be
ishments employed
22
disturbed.

One of the clearest doctrinal examples of the judiciary's deference to nations in the extradition process is found in the non-inquiry
rule, which bars courts from considering a person's post-extradition
safety. Pursuant to this rule, even a defendant's legitimate fears of
power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution."); Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1217 (D.C. Cir.)
(specifically holding that the United States Constitution overrides the SOFA Treaty and
the USA-FRG Supplementary Agreement), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972); Bell v.
Clark, 437 F.2d 200, 203 (4th Cir. 1971) (testing treaty against Constitution).
119. Id.; see also Reid, 354 U.S. at 16 ("no agreement with a foreign nation can confer
power on the Congress, or on any other branch of the government, which is free from the
restraints of the Constitution.").
120. Burt, 737 F.2d at 1486 (citation omitted).
121. Id. at 1487.
122. Id. at 1487 (citations omitted).
123. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 789-90 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
882 (1986); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 516 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981);
Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1105 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1036
(1980); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174-75 (2d Cir. 1980); Peroffv. Hylton, 563 F.2d
1099, 1102 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189,
1192-93 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972); In re Pazienza, 619 F. Supp.
611, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Singh, 123 F.R.D. 127, 129-40 (D.N.J. 1987).
Traditionally, federal courts have refused to consider questions relating to the
procedures or treatment that might await an individual on extradition. For example in
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being subjected to future due process deprivations are deflected by
the courts and relegated to the exclusive purview of the executive
branch.'
The narrow grounds for challenging the non-inquiry rule were
articulated in Gallina v. Fraser. . There, an Italian national challenged his extradition on the grounds that Italy had impermissibly
tried him in absentia.1 6 While finding dispositive the fact that no
case had "allowed the court to inquire into the procedures which
await the relator upon extradition,"2 ' the court noted that it could
"imagine situations where [a] relator, upon extradition, would be
subject to procedures or punishments so antipathetic to a federal
court's sense of decency [that they would] require reexamination of
the [non-inquiry] principle." 28
Despite this encouraging dictum, the Gallina exception to the
non-inquiry rule has not expanded individual rights in extradition
proceedings. Illustrative of this point is the recent review of Gallina
in Ahmad v. Wigen.2 9 Ahmad sought a writ of habeas corpus to
prevent his extradition to Israel for charges related to his attack on
Prushinowski v. Samples, 734 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1984), the court refused to prevent extradition despite petitioner's claim that his constitutional right to religious expression
would be violated by incarceration in a British prison which refused to cater to strict re-

ligious diets.
For a general discussion of the non-inquiry rule, see Jacques Semmelman, Federal
Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition
Proceedings,76 CORNELL L. REV. 1198 (1991).
124. Abmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 412 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); see also Glucksman v.
Henkel, 221 U.S. 508 (1910) ("courts are bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to
assume that the trial... will be fair."); Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976) (noting that it is not "the business of our courts to assume the responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judicial system of another foreign nation.").
In re Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237, 1244 (7th Cir. 1980), the court noted: "[W[e often
have difficulty discerning the law of neighboring States, which operate in the same legal
system that we do; the chance of error is much greater when we try to construe the law of
a country whose legal system is much different from our own. The possibility of error
warns us to be even more cautious of expanding judicial power over extradition matters."
125. 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960).
126. Id. at 77.
127. Id. at 78.
128. Id. at 79. Accord United States ex rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925, 928
(2d Cir. 1974); Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1195 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
856 (1980); see also DemJanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986) (holding that the court would not inquire into the procedures
of the extraditing nation unless they are found to be "antipathetic to a federal courts
sense of decency"); Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir.
1983) (holding that extraditing courts generally do not inquire into the procedures or
treatment awaiting a surrendered fugitive and noting that the Gallina exception has yet
to be employed in an extradition case).
129. 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
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a passenger bus.13 On his habeas corpus writ, Ahmad argued that
Israel's extradition request should be denied, because if he were
extradited, he would "face procedures and treatment aitipathetic to
a court's sense of decency." 3'
The District Court listed protections which safeguarded extradited individuals. The United States does not enter into extradition
treaties with countries that it does not trust. 32 Also, the executive
branch retains the unilateral right to stay extradition, 3 3 and courts
can, "as an independent branch of government," block an individual's extradition if the executive branch does not intervene on behalf
of an individual whose safety is in jeopardy. 34 Ahmad further noted
that "courts may not be parties to abusive judicial practices, even
where sensitive foreign relations matters are concerned."35
130. Id. at 394. After fleeing Israel, Ahmad was located in Venezuela, expelled to the
United States, and charged with a number of crimes listed in the United States-Israel extradition treaty. Id.
131. Id. at 395.
132. Id. at 411. But the United States has been willing to enter into relations with
countries it does not trust wh~n it is in its interest to do so. See supranote 56.
133. Id. at 411. See also In re Tang Yee-Chun, 674 F. Supp. 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(finding that it is the function of the Secretary of State, not the courts, to determine
whether or not extradition can be avoided on humanitarian grounds).
134. Ahmad, 726 F.Supp at 411-12.
135. Id. at 412. The court wrote:
Despite the fact that the executive branch has a constitutional duty and right to
conduct foreign policy, and the legislative and executive branches together have
the duty and right to enter into treaties for extradition, the courts are not, and
cannot be, a rubber stamp for the other branches of government in the exercise
of extradition jurisdiction. They must, under article III of the Constitution, exercise their independent judgment in a case or controversy to determine the
propriety of an individual's extradition. The executive may not foreclose the
courts from exercising their responsibility to protect the integrity of the judicial
process. A court must ensure that it is not used for purposes which do not comport with our Constitution or principles of fundamental fairness.
Id.
The Ahmad court also reviewed The Soering Case, European Court of Human Rights
of the Council in Stasbourg on July 7, 1989. Slip sheet 111989/1611217, where the
European Court intervened to prevent Soering's extradition from Great Britain to the
United States. Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 413. Soering claimed if extradited for murder he
would be placed on death row, which would violate article 3 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Id. The relevant
language in that covenant provides: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment." Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224.
The European Court first reasoned that extradition could be prevented "where
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if
extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment in the requesting country." 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35.
These "substantial grounds" required proof of first, a "substantial probability that he or
she can rebut the presumption of State Department propriety in assuming the fairness of
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Despite its authority and admitted obligation to intervene on
an individual's behalf, the court noted that the judiciary does not
ordinarily inquire into the condition awaiting an extradited individual because of the absence of post-extradition protections.3 6 Ahmad
explained that the State Department monitors the treatment of an
the judicial process by the requesting country." Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 415. Second, the
petitioner was required to demonstrate by "clear and convincing evidence that upon extradition he or she will face a lack of due process, or torture or other cruel and inhuman
treatment in the requesting country." Id. at 416. The petitioner's burden of proof is also
met by a showing it is "more probable than not" that the foreign country will treat him
unfairly. Id. The court concluded that the "extreme conditions" of death row," with the
ever present and mounting anguish of awaiting execution of the death penalty" went beyond Article III's threshold." Id. at 413. For a general review of the Soering Case, see
Stephan Breitenmuser and Gunter E. Wilms, Human Rights v. Extradition:The Soering
Case, 3 MICH. J. INT'L L. 845 (1990).
There are other international documents which theoretically provide the basis for
individual human rights protection. For example, there are portions of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights G.A. Res 2200a, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp (No. 16) at
52, art. 9 U.N. doc AJ6316 (1966) which, on their face might protect individuals. Part II,
Article 5 of the Covenant provides, in relevant part, that:
Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State,
group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at
the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their
limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant
(emphasis added).
Article 9 provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest of detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established
by law (emphasis added).
Article 10 provides that "[aill persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person."
See also European Convention on Human Rights 213 U.N.T.S 221; European
Commission of Human Rights; European Court of Human Rights; Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, First U.N. Congress in Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders Annex I.A. at 67, U.N. Doc. a/CONF /6/1 (1956), adopted July 31,
1957 by the U.N. Economic and Social Council, E.S.C. Res 663C (XXIV), 24 U.N. ESCOR
Supp (No. 1), at 11, U.N. Doc. E /13048 (1947).
The United States government consistently had' defended its refusal to ratify
important international human rights treaties by asserting that domestic law provides
more protection than its international law counterparts. See Dean Rusk, A Personal
Reflection on InternationalConventions on Human Rights, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 515,520
(1981). Note that several countries will not extradite an individual if the procedures in
the requesting State are contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights:
Switzerland, Austria and the German Federal Republic. Christine Van Den Wyngaert,
Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Extradition: Opening Pandora's
Box?, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 757, 759 (1990).
See generally John H. Wakefield, How the Working Organs of the European
Convention Have Elevated the Individual to the Level of Subject of InternationalLaw, 12
I.L.S.A. J. INT'L L. 27 (1988).
136. Ahmad, 726 F.Supp. at 410, 419.
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extraditee after he leaves the United Sates to insure that conditions
consistent with principles of fundamental fairness are fulfilled." 7
The court concluded by listing three reasons why Ahmad was
not likely to be subject to abusive practices. First, there was no evidence that persons extradited to Israel from the United States in the
past had been denied due process. 3 8 Second, Ahmad did not "fit the
profile" of a person against whom Israeli authorities were likely to
"exert pressure."3 9 Third, Israel assured 40
the United States government that Ahmad would be treated fairly.
Courts have been reluctant to accord extradition defendants
other constitutional protections. Romeo v. Roache'4 ' rejected alleged
violations of Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights where
Romeo claimed that he had not been given his Miranda warnings,
that his mental incompetency rendered him incapable of knowingly
consenting to his post-arrest interview, and that under the pretext of
a search warrant for a year and a half old murder charge, a search
in excess
of the scope authorized by the warrant had been con142
ducted.

In dismissing Romeo's constitutional claims, the court pointed
out that state, rather than federal, officials conducted the challenged
interview and search, and that dismissing the extradition proceedings would not deter states from similar conduct in the future. 14 3 The
court concluded that "more egregious conduct than that alleged here
would be required before a court should interfere in international
affairs by denying foreign states their rights under extradition trea-'

137. Id. at 419. The court also noted that it "was informed that the State Department
will observe the trial abroad to insure that its conditions are fulfilled." Id. at 410.
Research has uncovered no instances where these post-extradition protections have been
invoked to protect an individual after extradition.
138. Id. at 417.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 820 F.2d 540 (1st Cir. 1987).
142. Id. at 542-43. Romeo's mental competency claim was actually a form of constitutional claim, based on In re Extradition of Artukovic, 628 F. Supp. 1370, 1375 (C.D. Cal.
1986). There the government's contention that competence was not a proper subject of inquiry in extradition proceedings was rejected because of the Sixth Amendment guarantee
of effective assistance counsel to all persons before the court in matters affecting life and
liberty, and that the Fifth Amendment fair hearing right requires that a defendant have
minimum competence. Artukovic, 628 F. Supp. at 1375. However, the Romeo court relied
upon Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 462 (1913), which Artukovic did not consider, holding that incompetence claims were appropriately heard at trial, not before extradition.
The court added that the incompetency standard used in Artukovic was from criminal
cases, and that extradition proceedings were not criminal prosecutions. Romeo, 820 F.2d at
543-44.
143. Id. at 545.
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ties."'
Extradition defendants also cannot use the Constitution as a
defense to otherwise unconstitutional procedural practices. In
Hooker v. Klein,145 Hooker was charged with theft of corporate assets
after the dissolution of a Canadian company. 146 After a court found
that "no crime had been committed in Canada for which appellant
could be extradited," an extradition request was submitted to a second court, on the same facts, on the grounds that previously Hooker
had erroneously been allowed to rebut evidence. 4 Hooker claimed
that the reinstitution of extradition proceedings violated his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. 48 In granting the
extradition, the court wrote that "relief for abuse of multiple attempts to extradite lies not in judicial limitation but rather in the
in fulfilling its obligations under
fair mindedness of the" 1government
49
the extradition treaty.
Finally, extradition defendants have been denied protection
under the "remedies and recourses" provisions of some extradition
treaties, which allow individuals to avail themselves of the constitu144. Id. This reasoning has been echoed in other contexts. Courts have also held that
the Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is not an "appropriate consideration" for extradition proceedings, Freedman v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 1252, 1265
(N.D. Ga. 1977), and duch right should be "limited by its terms to criminal proceedings,"
Jhirad v. Ferradina, 536 F.2d 478, 485 n.9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976).
145. 573 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932 (1978). See Shelley M.
Goldstein, Comment, Extraditionand Double Jeopardy:Will the "Same Transaction"Test
Succeed in an InternationalContext?, 6 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 141 (1980).
146. 573 F.2d at 1363.
147. Id. at 1364.
148. Id. at 1365.
149. Id. Not surprisingly, double jeopardy provisions do not apply to separate
sovereigns in extradition proceedings. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978)
(Indian tribes are separate sovereigns such that a defendant may be prosecuted by both
federal government and Navaho tribe for crimes arising out of one act); contrast this position with the language in Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978) where the court
wrote:
Because jeopardy attaches before the judgment becomes final, the constitutional
protection [of double jeopardy] also embraces the defendant's "valued right to
have his trial completed by a particular tribunal." The reasons why this "valued
right" merits constitutional protection are worthy of repetition. Even if the first
trial is not completed, a second prosecution may be grossly unfair. It increases
the financial and emotional burden on the accused, prolongs the period in which
he is stigmatized by an unresolved accusation of wrongdoing, and may even enhance the risk that an innocent defendant may be convicted. The danger of such
unfairness to the defendant exists whenever a trial is aborted before it is completed. Consequently, as a general rule, the prosecutor is entitled to one, and
only one, opportunity to require an accused to stand trial.
434 U.S. 497, 503-05 (citations omitted); see also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959)
(state's prosecution of a defendant after acquittal on a federal indictment for substantially
identical facts does not violate due process clause).
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tional protections of the extraditing forum. In Kamrin v. United
States,10 Kamrin sought "to prevent his extradition to Australia on
the ground that the United States statute of limitations would bar"
his prosecution in Australia. 151 The Treaty provided that "the person
whose extradition is sought shall have the right to use such remedies and recourses as are provided by the [law of the requested
state.]"' 52
The court wrote that when the United States is the' requested
country, while delay in seeking extradition is relevant to the
Secretary of State's final extradition determination,. "the delay may
not... serve as a defense to... extradition proceedings. 53 Adopting
Charlton's reasoning, the court held that in the absence of an express treaty provision, a statute of limitations could only be advanced as a defense to criminal proceedings upon return to the requesting state."
Turning to the Treaty, the court found that Kamrin could not
avail himself of its "remedies and recourses" provision. The court
began by noting that bail may only be granted in special circumstances. 55 This special circumstance requirement undermined
Kamrin's claim that "bail is one of the remedies and recourses of
United States law to which an extraditee is entitled."5 6 Kamrin was

thus denied the rights of the requested country under the rationale
even
that due process rights cannot be extended extraterritorially,
157
though he had claimed them in the requested country.
Extradition jurisprudence and practice are implicit and explicit
statements about the boundaries of individual rights. These statements have been clear and telling: The legacy of Justice Holmes'
language in Fernandez5 ' has been to define individual rights as a
function of the form of the extradition process, regardless of its substance, perception by the extradited individual, or its use by the
involved parties. Despite the occasional pro forma extension of the
confines of Fernandez, such as in the Gallina exception to the noninquiry rule or the dictum in Ahmad or Burt, 59 the judiciary's
150. 725 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir. 1984).
151. Id. at 1226.
152. Id- at 1227, quoting Extradition Treaty, May 8, 1976, U.S.-Australia, 27 U.S.T. 957.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Kamrin, 725 F.2d at 1227. Kamrin had relied upon the District Court's opinion
in United States v. Williams,480 F. Supp. 482 (D. Mass 1979), reu'd, 611 F.2d 914 (1st Cir.

1979), which permitted the grant of bail in extradition proceedings.
156. Kamrin, 725 F.2d at 1228.
157. Id.
158. 268 U.S. 311 (1925).

159. Ironically, in each of these cases the promised exception to the non-inquiry rule
did not bear fruit, as each extradition request was approved.
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reluctance to think systematically about extradition as a complex of
political, legal and international processes which require scrutiny
has not changed. The implications of the judiciary's refusal to think
beyond the form of extradition proceedings in construing the rights
of extradition defendants are amplified by its treatment of the
specialty and double criminality doctrines. Notwithstanding minor
rhetorical variations, courts have interpreted the doctrines as protecting individual nations, not individual rights. Finally, courts have
been reluctant to grant constitutional protections to defendants,
ruling that some constitutional considerations are "inapplicable in
extradition proceedings," 16 0 and subjugating others to diplomatic
interests.
The previous cases demonstrate that extradition defendants
are denied many fundamental procedural and substantive protections, such as the right to contradict evidence brought against them,
and that those protections within the discretionary power of the
court, such as bail, cross-examination and discovery, are rarely extended.' 6 ' The fundamental rationale for denying individuals protection in extradition proceedings is that extradition is not a criminal
62
trial and, accordingly, rules of criminal trials are inapplicable.
Underlying extradition law is the assumption that extradition
proceedings are distinct from criminal trials in their ends: courts
view extradition as a process which transports a person to trial, not
as the process which tries them. 163 Accordingly, courts transfer the
obligation to provide protections, with the extraditee, to the requesting state. Yet the jurisprudential premise that extradition is merely
a procedural incident to a subsequent trial should be questioned.
The rights accorded to individuals in criminal trials-and the constitutional source from which those protections emanate M - indicate
that subjection to the institutional and coercive processes of the
state can be dangerous. 5 Subjection to state scrutiny, of any sort, is
160. Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 485 n.9 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833
(1976).
161. For instances in which courts have chosen not to exercise their discretion to
grant discovery, see Emami v. U.S. Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of California, 834 F.2d
1444 (1987); In re Extradition of Singh, 123 F.R.D. 108 (D.N.J. 1987). For instances in
which courts have chosen not to exercise their discretionary power to grant bail, see
Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903); United States v. Messina, 566 F. Supp. 740
(E.D.N.Y 1983).
162. Moreover, courts have held that the discretionary powers of the court to intervene and grant procedural protections to extradition defendants have also been subjected
to policy interests. See supra note 99.
163. See, e.g., Melia v. United States, 667 F.2d 300, 302 (2d Cir. 1981) ("An extradition hearing is not the occasion for an adjudication of guilt or innocence.").
164. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, VII, VIII, XIV.
165. For an example within extradition jurisprudence of distinction between differ-
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a potentially abusive practice which American jurisprudence, since
its inception, has wisely offset through procedural protections.16 6
Extradition law should benefit from this lesson as well. Accordingly,
extradition should be considered as a procedure which, as falling
within the purview of the executive branch, might be abused, or
which might be inherently abusive. It should be considered as a
process which implicates rights concerns that many people feel, and
that our Constitution states, are important. Extradition law should
simply be a function of the substance, not the form, of extradition
proceedings.
Further, the substantive and procedural protections afforded
defendants in extradition proceedings, aside from serving as formal
statements about the value of individual liberty, send messages to
governments about the permissible use of their institutional processes. Statements like these are especially important in our constitutional democracy, because the separate governmental branches
are expected to monitor each other. 167 Yet present extradition law, as
a social and philosophical guide to the executive branch, is unreflective of both the checks and balances on which our governmental
system rests, as well as many historically and presently shared feelings about proper governmental behavior. One example involves the
notion that individuals should not, civilly or criminally, be brought
to trial more than once for the same offense. 168 Courts have permitent types of processes, see Van Cauwenburghe v. Baird, 486 U.S. 517 (1988), discussed infra note 217 and accompanying text.
166. Many areas of our jurisprudence have built protections around the context and
the potential deprivations of individual liberty. However, the trend has been towards narrowing these protections. See Rafeedie v. Immigration and Naturalization Service:
Summary Exclusion and the Procedural Due Process Rights of Permanent Resident
Aliens, 13 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 179 (1990); M. Shane Craighead, Note, Paillot v.
Wooton: Determining the Complexity of PredeprivationHearingsRequired by Procedural
Due Process, 51 LA. L. REV. 923 (1991); Ideologically Excluded Aliens and their
Entitlement to FundamentalProceduralRights, 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNATL L.J. 229 (1989);
Amy J. Borman, Note, ProceduralDue Processand "The Mere Right of Reply"-Ducheine v.
Williams, 20 U. TOL. L. REv. 765 (1989); George F. Driscoll, Jr., Case Comment, 22
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 201 (1988). See also Mathews v. Eldridge 424 U.S. 319 (1976);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
167. Note that the reality of modem day American government is otherwise. David
Broyles notes
[tlhese days a discussion of the Constitution's separated powers must be prefaced by a rueful acknowledgment that these separated powers have disappeared. Separated powers, that is to say, is absent from the place our Founders
assigned to it in our political science. It is no longer considered our chief means
for realizing freedom and good government.
David Broyles, Separated Power and its Opponents, in PRINCIPLES OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 111 (Robert L. Utley, Jr. ed., 1989).
168. The emphasis in double jeopardy theory is that the system itself should not be
employed against individuals. One scholar has commented:
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of
ted circumvention of this value by allowing the reinstitution
169
extradition proceedings if the first extradition effort fails.
Ironically, the presumed remedy for the government's abuse of
power in the extradition process lies with the feared abuser, the
government itself. Decisions to reinstitute extradition proceedings
are currently bound only by governmental fair-mindedness. 17 0 This
standard stems from the judiciary's great deference to the executive
branch in extradition proceedings. However, the fair-mindedness
standard has not been a sufficient bar to otherwise objectionable
governmental conduct for two reasons. 17' First, courts have constituted fair-mindedness not as a objective product of shared legal or
social norms, but as a function of prevailing (governmental) political
wants. Second, governmental fair-mindedness is an especially suspect means for securing governmental compliance with legal values
given past governmental conduct; as Burt demonstrated, the govimperatives and
ernment can sidestep otherwise confining legal
7
values before it is forced to comply with them. 1
Judicial occupation with the form of extradition proceedings
also neglects the perception of the extradited individual. Refusing to
classify extradition as a criminal trial, or at least as a process with
many similarities to a criminal trial, disregards that from a defendant's perspective, extradition bears a striking functional resemblance to a trial. It is a trial over whether or not an individual will
be compelled to leave the location of his choice and be sent to a foreign country against his wishes. It is a trial over whether or not an
We should, therefore, pause to ask why double jeopardy is intrinsic to
Western legal thought. The answer lies in the type of governmental conduct
that gives rise to its protections. Other Bill of Rights guarantees affect different
parts of the criminal process. The privilege against self-incrimination of the
fourth amendment, for example, limits the government's evidence gathering capability. The right to counsel and to a jury prescribe a procedure to be followed
in seeking a conviction. The double jeopardy clause, however, protects against
using the criminal process itself to oppress individuals.
George C. Thomas I, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. REV. 827, 837
(1988).
169. See supranotes 145 to 149 and accompanying text.
170. See Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1365 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932
(1978).
171. See United States v. Lovasco 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977), writing that "while it
may be fundamentally unfair for the government as enforcer of its criminal statutes to
compel an accused to respond to and stand trial for charges when the government's delay
in bringing the charges has resulted in actual prejudice to the accused .... "
172. In re Extradition of Burt, 737 F.2d 1477 (7th Cir. 1984). One possible test the
courts could fashion would involve: (1) a list of the protections which are available in extradition proceedings and what those protections mean; and (2) the requirement that the
government would have demonstrate a compelling interest in circumventing these
protections.
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individual will stand to face charges in a jurisdiction which does not
share his political or legal views. In one way, extradition proceedings are even more threatening than a trial. Trials have a beginning
and an end, but extradition procedures have no judicially imposed
start or finish. In short, the organization of extradition law around
the form of extradition proceedings ignores the nature of the extradition process and its use by and impact upon the parties to that
process.
The judiciary's repeated rejection of jurisdictional challenges to
extradition proceedings should also be challenged. While extradition
is defined by statutes, the specialty and double criminality doctrines
and the non-inquiry rule have been interpreted by resorting only to
broad, indeterminate theories of international comity and reciprocity. Courts have repeatedly rejected attacks on extradition orders
utilizing the specialty and double criminality doctrines under the
rationale3 that they protect international relations, not individual
7
rights.
Yet these affirmative defenses to extradition do not merely
govern and serve to strengthen international relations; they arguably imply independent individual rights. These rights inhere in the
letter of the defenses themselves. Specialty requires that no state try
an individual for crimes other than those for which he was extradited. Double criminality requires that no state try an individual for
a crime that one party to the extradition process deems as not
criminal. Despite this doctrinal clarity, case law has interpreted the
"shall not" imperative in these doctrines as relative, subject to the
manifest political preferences of one state and the perceived political
preferences of another. In sum, the redefinition of specialty and
double criminality as protective of only states' rights results from
practical failures to enforce each doctrine's letter, not from a reasoned understanding of the relationship between the state and the
individual. This understanding, as with the recognition of procedural protections within extradition proceedings, should come from
considering, in addition to political limits on state conduct, the inherent boundaries treaty language imposes-on that conduct.
The use of the specialty and double criminality doctrines as
guarantors of state, as opposed to individual, liberty raises broader
political questions of individual-state relations. It assumes that the
individual, as a political entity, is subordinate to the state. But the
state is created by the people: it is not an independent, autonomous
entity severable from the citizens which constitute it. 174 In other
173. See United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1009 (1986).

174. Professor Allott notes:
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words, while the state is granted rights and authority from individuals, the source of those rights and authority are strictly individual preferences, not the interests of the state apart from those preferences. 175 Due to the complex nature of modern life, the nature of
the citizen-state relationship is admittedly blurred. But social realities which make power relationships less visible to traditional overseers of political relations, such as other branches of government or
the electorate, should not be excuses to redefine these relationships.
Extradition law should-via the Constitution-insure that citizen
preferences are examined, continually expressed, and defended. This
scrutiny is especially important given that extradition is a process
generally removed from public debate and comment. Yet despite this
strong case for linking political accountability with doctrinal clarity,
courts have summarily reasoned that individual preferences-expressed as defendants' individual rights claims in extradition hearings-are utterly subject to the will and practice of the state. More
precisely, and more troubling, the claims are subject to the will and
preferences of persons that are acting in the name of the state. 7 6
Finally, the courts' reluctance to grant extradition defendants
constitutional protections should also be questioned. As with the
issues of procedural protections and jurisdictional challenges, the
scope of constitutional protections has proceeded from the judiciary's
formalistic analysis of the extradition process. 17 Yet, as with proceThe subjects of international law are states but only in the sense that the pre-

sent conceptual structure of international law attaches legal rights... to the
category "states"... . The subjects of international law, in the sense of those for
whose benefit the law assigns all rights and duties, are the peoples of the world.
Philip Allott, State Responsibility and the Unmaking ofInternationalLaw, 29 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 1, 14 (1988).
The Supreme Court has recognized that even the comity doctrine, which concerns
the deference states afford each other, is protective of individual rights:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nations allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own. citizens or of other persons
who are under the protection of its laws.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (emphasis added).
175. Yet the state often does not behave this way. See Allott, supra note 174, at 14.
For an inquiry into why states voluntarily follow their own moral directives, see Thomas
M. Franck, Legitimacy in the InternationalSystem, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1988).
176. To what degree is extradition, which is supposedly done in the name of the
state, actually a process which reflects only the institutional needs of a single agency
within the state? This possibility makes scrutinizing the means and ends of extradition
more important. See infra part VI.
177. For example, Jhiradheld that the Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
trial is not an "appropriate consideration" for extradition proceedings. Jhirad v.
Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976).
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dural protections, constitutional protections should arise from the
substance of the extradition proceedings, not their form. "Substance"
involves nothing less than an examination of what rights are implicated in the extradition process and how those rights are affected by
the process. Extradition law is currently wasting a tremendous opportunity to square our constitutional jurisprudence with difficult
political and international issues. Instead of addressing these issues, the law ignores them.
The same criticism can be particularly directed at the non-inquiry rule. Our obligations to safeguard individual rights should not
end at our borders, especially in an age when democratic and humanitarian values and ideology are used as weapons to wage
America's wars. If the United States and other countries increasingly expect each other to follow shared norms, these norms should
simultaneously be enforced domestically. With regard to the noninquiry rule, this could make non-inquiry determinations rest on a
balance between the political reasons for non-inquiry with the applicability of those reasons to a particular state which petitions the
United States to extradite an individual. Further, political realities
could alter the presently all-or-nothing character of the non-inquiry
rule, by establishing intermediate procedures to protects the rights
178
of an individual who may be in jeopardy.
Extradition jurisprudence assumes that some constitutional
protections are subject to diplomacy. 79 This assumption makes poor
theoretical sense. Diplomacy is neither constitutional law nor a valid
principle of constitutional interpretation. The right to engage in
diplomacy is accorded deference because it is a valid expression of
the foreign relations authority vested in the executive branch; but
that does not mean that every individual act of diplomacy is equally
entitled to constitutional approval.
Moreover, constitutional protections do not merely shield individuals, they constrain government from abuses of authority.18
Courts have been reluctant to consider extradition law as a normative statement concerning governmental conduct. 8 ' Romeo181 found
178. This exists already, to some degree. Individuals are allegedly assigned to foreign
countries at times to protect an individual's rights. See Ahmad v. Wigen, F. Supp.
(E.D.N.Y. 1975). This type of protection could be expanded to, perhaps, insuring that the
individual is tried by a third party before transferred. Or perhaps that an individual's
sentence is carried out in the requested state.
179. See e.g., In re Extradition of Burt, 737 F.2d 1477 (7th Cir. 1984).
180. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez I, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988).
181. Yet such an inquiry is arguably implied by constitutional law. See Ziyad Motala,
The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Law: The Philosophical Origins and Differences
Between the Western Liberal and Soviet Communist State Law, 8 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 225,
227 (1990) ("Constitutionalism is clearly linked to a set of political ideals.").
182. Romeo v. Roache, 820 F.2d 540 (1st Cir. 1987).
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that the "[dismissal of extradition proceedings would not seem to
serve much of a deterrent effect to such state conduct." While the
deterrent value for governments, or individuals in their service, of
dismissing extradition proceedings is debatable, it would nevertheless send a signal to society, generally, about the value of protecting
individuals from wrongful governmental practice. This might influence our political culture, which in turn might affect the type of
policy and legal intrusions the citizenry is willing to tolerate.
In addition to the fundamental absence of individual protections in extradition proceedings, courts have also removed potential
constitutional protections, even when they are specifically guaranteed by treaty. In Kamrin,' the court denied the petitioner's constitutional claims, even though the applicable treaty guaranteed him
whatever rights the requested country had. The court denied his
claims on the grounds that the Constitution cannot be asserted extraterritorially and that bail was only to be granted in special circumstances.1M Yet Kamrin was not trying to assert an extraterritorial constitutional claim, he was simply trying to avail himself of an
applicable territorial constitutional protection, in accordance with
the Treaty. The Treaty gave individuals the rights to assert the
requested countries' constitutional protections; it did not make those
rights subject to one country's unilateral decision to water down its
constitutional protections in extradition proceedings.
In summary, current extradition jurisprudence constitutes a
narrow statement about individual rights. This statement, moreover, rests on three static and questionable assumptions. The first is
that extradition is not a criminal trial, and that extradition law is a
function of the form, not the substance of extradition practice. This
simply does not reflect current use of the extradition process. The
second assumption is that individual rights, to the extent that they
exist at all, are only derivative of states' rights. This ignores both the
relationship between the state and the individual our political culture
envisions, and the values our laws, governmental structure and history
ensure. Finally, extradition jurisprudence dictates that behavior otherwise violative of the Constitution is transformed into constitutionally
permissible conduct when it is directed against individuals the
courts do not feel compelled to protect. This does more than elevate
diplomacy above the Constitution; it subordinates constitutional
principles to simple political expediency. It is against the backdrop
of extradition jurisprudence as a procedural, substantive and normative statement about individuals that this Comment turns to
consider the United States' acquisition of foreign defendants.
183. Kamrin v. United States, 725 F.2d 1225, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984).
184. Id at 1227.
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The United States'Acquisitionof ForeignDefendants

Just as the extradition of defendants from the United States
protects international relations more than individual rights, the
United States' acquisition of foreign defendants also restricts individual due process rights. Due process jurisprudence regarding the
United States' acquisition of foreign defendants began with Ker v.
Illinois.'85 Ker, who was abducted from Peru by a private party to
answer larceny charges in the United States, asserted that the abduction violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
and the extradition treaty between the United States and Peru.'8
The Court held that due process is "complied with when the party is
regularly indicted by the proper grand jury in the State court, has a
trial according to the forms and modes prescribed for such trials,
and when, in that trial and proceedings, he is deprived of no rights
to which he is lawfully entitled."'
While conceding instances in which acquisition of a defendant
might give rise to constitutional claims, the Court concluded that
"for mere irregularities in the manner in which [a defendant] may be
brought into the custody of the law, we do not think he is entitled to
say that he should not be tried at all.... ."" Ker thus effectively held
that the means by which a person is brought within a state's control
is irrelevant to the state's authority to try him.
The Court also dismissed Ker's claim that the United States
violated its obligations under the extradition treaty with Peru. The
treaty granted Ker no right to claim asylum in Peru and the abduction, moreover, was carried out "without any pretense of authority
under the treaty or from the government of the United States.' 8 9
Ker is generally cited with a case decided over 60 years later,
Frisbie v. Collins.9 ' Frisbie, who was seized and forcibly brought to
Michigan to stand trial, claimed that his murder conviction should
be quashed as his abduction violated the Due Process Clause and the
Federal Kidnapping Act.' 9 ' Following Ker, the Court concluded that
"due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprised of the charges
against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional
procedural safeguards."'9 2
185. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).

186. Id. at 438, 440.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 442-43. Ker was abducted by a Pinkerton agent in the employ of Ker's
alleged victim. Id.
190. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
191. Id. at 520.
192. Id. at 522.
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The Ker-Frisbie cases, along with United States v. Rauscher,193
constitute the fundamental due process analysis applied to the
United States' acquisition of individuals abroad. In Rauscher, the
Supreme Court acknowledged the right of a person extradited pursuant to a treaty to invoke the rule of specialty to avoid persecution. 194 The court also held that a treaty is the "law of the land,"
equivalent to an act of the legislature, as distinguished from other
countries, in which a treaty is merely an international contract."I
The Ker-Frisbie doctrine and Rauscher originally sketched a
hollow and undefined, but at least nominal, balance between state
conduct and individual rights. Presently, this balance has, in the
name of policy objectives, been almost entirely eviscerated.
Rauscher, with its promise of adhering to the letter of extradition
treaties, has been wrung of most of its potential due process
protection, while the Ker-Frisbie doctrine has been continually
sustained to sanction the methods of foreign drug policy objectives.
Rauscher has been limited in several ways. As with specialty
claims brought to stay prosecution in foreign nations, many decisions have determined that an individual cannot avoid prosecution
by asserting individual rights under extradition treaties.5 6 For example, in Fiocconi v. United States, 97 two Italian defendants were
indicted on charges that they conspired to import heroin, a crime
that was not listed in the existing extradition treaty between the
United States and Italy.' The United States asked the Italian court
to broaden its extradition order, but the Italian government did not
respond.'9
Restricting Rauscher's protective stance over individual rights,
the court held that the specialty doctrine was only designed to prevent the United States from violating its international obligations.0 0
193. 119 U.S 407 (1886).
194. Id. at 430.
195. Id. at 418-19. This language is ironic, given the development of due process
jurisprudence as applied to United States conduct abroad. In many respects treaties, although the "law of the land, equivalent to an act of the Legislature," have been
interpreted as contracts, which the United States government can unilaterally enforce,
rewrite or rescind at will. Interpretation of doctrines, such as double criminality and specialty, also reflect this contractual notion.
196. See e.g., United States v. Jetter, 722 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1983).
197. 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972).
198. Id. at 476.
199. Id. at 477.
200. Another argument for construing the specialty doctrine as protective of international relations, not individual rights, is found in United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289,
1300 (3d Cir. 1991), where the court wrote that "while a treaty limits a nation's discretion
to grant asylum, it does not change its power to deny asylum. When a nation waives its
right to enforce extradition treaty provisions, it essentially refuses to grant asylum to the
fugitive for the offense involved."
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Therefore the determination of whether or not Fiocconi could be
tried turned on the court's determination of whether the Italian
government would have considered the United States' prosecution of
Fiocconi for a crime he was not extradited for as a breach of the
treaty.20 1 The court found that Italy would not object to further
prosecution because of Italy's lack of formal protest and because the
prosecution constituted mere "technical refinements of local law."0 2
In reaching its holding, the court interpreted the Treaty's provision
that surrendered persons "shall in no case be tried for any... crime,
committed previously to that for which his... surrender is
asked... "203 as acquiescence to prosecution for crimes "before surrender, at least of the same general nature, provided only that they
were This
not antecedent
to that for which the surrender was asked."0 4
interpretation
of the specialty doctrine as protective only
of rights between nations, not individuals, continued in United
States v. Najohn.2 °' Najohn built on Fiocconi by noting that
protection under the rule of specialty exists "only to the extent that
the surrendering country wishes" because the primary concern is
"satisfaction of the requesting country's obligations."20 6 Noting that a
defendant could raise a specialty doctrine defense if the extraditing
country allowed, the court added that a defendant could be tried for
crimes beyond the treaty's reach if the asylum country consented.0 7
The prosecution of an individual for crimes beyond the letter of
an extradition treaty was permitted in United States v. Diwan, °8
which held that an extradited individual could only assert objections
to prosecutions that the asylum nation, Great Britain, might consider a breach of the treaty.20 9 Therefore, notwithstanding the defendant's extradition on theft-related offenses, in light of Great
Britain's express consent, Diwan could be tried for conspiracy to
persuade a minor into sexually explicit conduct.2 1 The Diwan majority explained that the rule of specialty was "designed to preserve
international relationships and to protect the institution of extradition."2 " Rauscher's objective was defined to insure that signatory
nations faithfully observe shared treaty obligations. Individual
201. Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 477.
202. Id. at 481.
203. Id. (quoting Extradition Convention, Mar. 23, 1868, U.S.-Italy, art. III, 15 Stat.
629, 631).
204. Id.
205. 785 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1980).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 864 F.2d 715 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 921 (1989).
209. Id. at 721
210. Id. at 720.
211. Id.
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rights could only be derived from whatever rights Great Britain had
under the Treaty.2
Narrowing of the specialty doctrine recently continued in
United States v. Riviere. 13 Riviere was extradited for marijuana
possession but tried for firearms offenses, which he contended violated the extradition treaty between Dominica and the United
States.2 14 While following Fiocconi, Najohn, and Diwan, the court
weakened the specialty doctrine further by basing its opinion on the
asylum implications inherent in Dominica's waiver of its right under
the treaty:
When a nation waives its right to enforce extradition treaty provisions, it

essentially refuses to grant asylum to the fugitive for the offense involved.
Inasmuch as Dominica expressly waived its rights under the treaty to ob-

ject to this country's proceedings after extradition, it effectively expressed
its intention that it would not grant asylum to Riviere for any offense for
which the United States intended to prosecute him,
an act completely
2 15
within Dominica's discretion as a sovereign nation.
The court added that "the mere existence of a treaty does not
create individual rights in fugitives found within the borders of a
party nation."2 16 By interpreting a waiver of objection to prosecute
for a specific charge as a state's express intention that it would not
grant asylum for any offense for which the United States would
prosecute, another potential individual protection under the specialty doctrine was lost.
Finally, even when the specialty doctrine has been invoked, its
217 the
scope has been narrowed. In Van Cauwenburghe v. Baird,
Supreme Court rejected a claim that specialty not only requires that
an extradited person be immune from criminal prosecution, but that
he be free from any judicial interference, including a civil suit:
[E]ven if the principle of specialty shields petitioner from service of proc-

ess in a civil suit while he is detained in the US following his extradition
and conviction-an issue on which we express no opinion--the right not to218be

burdened with a civil trial itself is not an essential aspect of that protection.

212. Id. at 721.
213. 924 F.2d 1289 (3d Cir. 1991).
214. Id. at 1290-91.

215. 924 F.2d at 1300-01. "The Attorney General and Minister for Legal Affairs,
Immigration and Labor of Dominica on April 14, 1989, executed a waiver of 'any and all
Rights and Obligations and Protections of the Commonwealth of Dominica' under Article
XII of the US-UK Treat." Id. at 1292. See Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, US-UK, 28
U.S.T. 227.
216. 924 F.2d at 1301.
217.486 U.S. 517 (1988).

218. Id. at 525.
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The Court, adopting Diwan's reasoning that specialty governs
international treaty obligations, predicted that the impact of its
decision would not be severe:
The conduct of a civil trial, prior to any attempt to subject the defendant
to a binding judgment of the court, does not significantly implicate the receiving state's obligation under the doctrine. Unlike a criminal prosecution, in which the coercive power of the state is brought to bear, the state's
involvement in the conduct of a private suit is minimal. The state's role is
simply to provide a forum for the resolution of a private dispute.219
Rauscher has largely been stripped of its value as a potential
individual rights protection. First, it has been interpreted as protecting the relationships between states, not individuals.2 20 Second,
courts have made the burden for state intervention on behalf of
individuals exceedingly high, requiring official state protest, while
they have been extremely permissive in interpreting foreign state
action (or inaction) as consent to prosecution. 221 They have also ex219. Id.
220. This Comment has considered how doctrines, such as specialty, are more protective of international relations than individual rights. This is consistent with the general difficulties international law has in considering individual rights claims. Professor
Bassiouni, for example, has noted that international law is "unable to fit [the individual]
in the conceptual framework of that discipline which was historically developed out of the
need to regulate institutions and not interpersonal relationships." BASSIOUNI, supra note
5, at 563. Bassiouni also commented that "nowhere in extradition law and practice can
the individual.., compel the requesting or requested state to adhere to internationally
recognized principles of extradition law if either state wishes not to apply them or to circumvent them." Id. Finally, he has noted that "extradition is still regarded.., as an institutional practice. States are the subjects of its regulation, while individuals are the
objects of its outcome." Id. at 562.
These theoretical impediments to individual rights claims should be considered
against the changing function of extradition. Historically, extradition has rarely been
used. The early perception may have been that individual rights were built into
international thinking via the presumption against granting extradition. Today
extradition is fast becoming a common form of criminal discourse between nations.
Second, as the science of international politics advances, states are becoming more adept
at furthering policy goals through incentives. This preseits individuals with less chance to
have their rights defended.
Despite these impediments, there are ways that abduction can be challenged on
international law grounds. One argument is that "any exercise of law enforcement by one
state on the territory of another is a violation of the latter's sovereignty." Lowenfeld,
supra note 36, at 472. A second argument is that "extraditiontreaties not only serve the
interests of states in law enforcement but also provide safeguards for persons whose
arrest and transfer is being sought." Id. at 473. A third argument is that "forcible
abduction carried out by a state is a violation of international human rights law." Id. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No.
71, art. 9, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
221. See Fiocconi v. United States, 462 F.2d 475 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059

(1972).
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panded the significance of non-protest, typically by broadening the
asylum countries' prosecutorial options. 222 Third, the specialty doctrine has been rejected outright at times, allowing individuals to be
prosecuted for crimes beyond the letter of extradition treaties with
what has been interpreted to be the requested countries' permission.
Fourth, even when the doctrine can be invoked, its use has been
limited. 2 3
While Rauscher was being eroded, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine
continued to be affirmed. The major challenge to the broad reach2 of
24
the Ker-Frisbie doctrine came in United States v; Toscanino.
Toscanino was lured to a deserted area in Uruguay by Uruguayan
policemen.2 Toscanino was knocked unconscious, thrown into a
car, 226 and brought to Brasilia, where he was tortured and interrogated by Brazilian authorities who were acting as United States
agents.227 Toscanino was denied food and sleep and only fed intravenously. m He was forced to walk without rest and was beaten when
he fell. 2 9 To induce Toscanino to answer questions, his fingers were
pinched with pliers, alcohol was flushed into his eyes and nose, and
fluids were forced into his anal passage.5 Electrodes were attached
to his earlobes, toes, and genitals, and he was shocked with electricity, which left him unconscious.23 '
Toscanino asserted that the United States government and the
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York were
aware of the interrogation and received reports of its progress. 2 2 He
also averred that a member of the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs of the Department of Justice was present and even
participated in some of the interrogation. 3
On appeal from his conviction, the Second Circuit first noted
that, since Frisbie, the Supreme Court had expanded due process
"beyond the mere guarantee of a fair procedure at trial."2u The court
222. See United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.

1009 (1986).
223. See Van Cauwenburghe v. Baird, 486 U.S. 517 (1988). See generally John G.
Kester, Some Myths of United States ExtraditionLaw, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1465-68 (1988).
224. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
225. Id. at 269.
226. Id.
227. Id.

228. Id. at 270.
229. Id.
230. Id.

231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 272. The court listed a series of Supreme Court decisions which 'bar[red]
the government from realizing directly the fruits of its own deliberate and unnecessary
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3 5 where the Supreme
cited Rochin v. California,"
Court set aside a
conviction that rested on evidence obtained through police brutality." Toscanino then held that due process requires a court to divest
itself of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant where it has been
acquired as the result of the government's "deliberate, unnecessary
and unreasonable" invasion of the accused's constitutional rights. 237
Despite its promise, Toscanino has not stopped, or even slowed,
the broad and continued use of the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine. It has been
eviscerated in the Second Circuit and rejected outright in others,
typically on the grounds that the Fifth Amendment places no restraints on the Government's power to seize criminals abroad. 238
The Second Circuit has narrowed Toscanino through both its
level-of-force analysis and by raising the prima facie elements of
proving actionable governmental "involvement."2 39 The level-of-force
analysis was announced in United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler,240
just one year after the Toscanino decision. Lujan was lured into
Bolivia by a United States agent. 241 He was taken into custody by
the Bolivian police, who were also acting as agents of the United
States.12 Lujan was not permitted to communicate with his embassy, or an attorney, and was involuntarily placed on a plane to
New York.2" He was never formally charged by the Bolivian police,
and the United States government never filed an extradition request.2 "
Citing Rochin's reference to government conduct which "offends

lawlessness in bringing the accused to trial." Id.
235. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
236. Id.
237. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275.
238. See Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 263 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 209 (1990); United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1531 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 986-88 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
239. The Sixth Circuit has also limited Toscanino's holding. In United States v.
Palaez, 930 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1991), Palaez argued that the District Court erred in
refusing to divest itself of jurisdiction over him and return him to Colombia. He argued
that the Fifth Amendmenfs Due Process Clause was violated by the alleged "forcible" abduction from Colombia. The court responded that Palaez did not contend that United
States officials had any involvement in the abduction and that he did not allege any
physical force or brutality. The court noted that the Supreme Court has held that a body
or person of a defendant is never "suppressible as a fact of an unlawful police arrest" or
detention. Id. at 525 (quoting I.N.S. v. Lopez Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984);
United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119
(1975)).
240. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
241. Id. at 63.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
justice of English speaking peoples," m' the court first wrote that
"lacking from Lujan's petition is any allegation of that complex of
shocking governmental conduct sufficient to convert an abduction
which is simply illegal into one which sinks to a violation of due
process."246 Second, the court noted that "the failure of Bolivia or
Argentina to object to Lujan's abduction... preclude[s] any violation
of international law which otherwise might have occurred." m7
The prohibitive force of Toscanino also has been weakened by
defining "governmental conduct" narrowly' In United States v.
Lira,"8 the Second Circuit found that Toscanino was not applicable
if the alleged mistreatment did not occur at the hands of United
States officials.249 Lira argued that he had been abducted illegally
from Chile and tortured by United States government agents."5
After his arrest and torture by the Chilean police, Lira was forced to
sign a decree expelling him from Chile.2' He was then placed aboard
a plane and arrested in New York.252 Despite the fact that the
United States had specifically requested Lira's arrest in and expulsion from Chile, the court found that "the evidentiary hearing produced no proof that representatives of the United States participated or acquiesced in the alleged misconduct of the Chilean offi245. Id. at 65 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952)).
246. Id. at 66.
247. Id. at 67.
248. 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
249. Id. at 70. Raising the level of proof required to demonstrate "governmental
conduct" is observable in areas outside of the abduction/extradition context. In United
States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991), Yunis challenged his conviction for
charges of conspiracy, aircraft piracy, and hostage-taking because of U.S. Navy involvement in the incident.
A basis for his appeal was the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits military involvement in police action unless expressly authorized by law. Id. at 1093. Looking to
other courts for instruction, the court found "that the Posse Comitatus Act imposes no restrictions on use of American armed forces abroad, [and] that Congress intended to
preclude military intervention in domestic civil affairs." Id. (citing Chandler v. United
States, 171 F.2d 921, 936 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949); D'Aquina v.
United States, 192 F.2d 338, 351 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 935 (1952)). The
court rejected Yunis' challenge, concluding that the Navy had played only a "passive" role
in the capture and had not violated the Posse Comitatus Act. Id. at 1094.
For another case expanding the bounds of Navy law enforcement activity, see United
States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 565 (9th Cir.) (despite finding a violation of a federal law
prohibiting use of Navy equipment to interdict the passage of vessels, the court refused to
sanction the Navy), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986).
250. Lira,515 F.2d at 68-69.
251. Id. Under the extradition treaty between the United States and Chile, a Chilean
national could not be extradited to the United States. Extradition Treaty, May 27, 1902,
U.S.-Chile, art. V, 32 Stat. 1850.
252. Lira, 515 F.2d at 70.
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cials."253
Second Circuit holdings which have limited the reach of the
Toscanino holding have been adopted by other Circuits. Recently, in
United States v. Zapata,54 Zapata claimed that United States courts
lacked jurisdiction to try him because he was seized in Peru and was
forcefully brought to the United States. Applying Lujan's level-offorce analysis, the Ninth Circuit determined that Zapata had not
alleged governmental conduct sufficiently "shocking and outrageous"
to preclude
the District Court from exercising jurisdiction over
25 5
him.

The Seventh Circuit addressed an abduction claim in MattaBalesteros v. Henman.2 16 Matta-Balesteros escaped from prison and
fled to his native Honduras." Matta-Ballesteros was later confronted by Honduran special troops and United States Marshals.5 8
He was allegedly handcuffed, arrested, beaten, and shocked with a
stun gun at the direction of United States Marshals.2 59 En route to
the United States, he was also allegedly beaten and burned by
United States Marshals.2 60 Upon arrival in the United States, an
examining physician found that the bruises on his head, face, scalp,
neck, feet and penis, as well as blisters on his back were consistent
with those caused by a stun gun.261 Matta-Ballesteros claimed, inter
alia, that his abduction by United States officials to face criminal
charges in the United States violated the Due Process Clause. 62
First, the court noted that individuals have no standing to
challenge violation of international treaty in the absence of a protest
by a sovereign nation. 21 Next, the court criticized Toscanino, finding
it of "ambiguous" constitutional origins, and noting that the remedy
253. Id. The court wrote that "no purpose would be served by holding the
Government responsible for the actions of the Chilean police." Id. at 71.
254. No. 88-5289, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 4644 (9th Cir. March 15, 1991).
255. Id. at *7.
256. 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990).
257. Id. at 256. Honduras does not extradite its nationals.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 257.
263. Id. at 259. Many courts have held that individuals do not have standing under
an extradition treaty to claim a violation. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler,
510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir.) ("even where a treaty provides certain benefits for
nationals... individual rights are only derivative through the states"), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981) ("absent protest
or objection by the offended sovereign, [a defendant has] no standing to raise violation of
international law as an issue"); United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 1981)
(criminal defendant lacks standing to challenge a violation of formal extradition
procedures).
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for due process violations during pretrial detention was an injunction or money damages, not divestiture of jurisdiction. The court
then concluded that Toscanino, to the extent that it effectively
2
created an exclusionary rule, was not law in the Seventh Circuit. 6
The Eleventh Circuit questioned Toscanino in United States v.
Darby. 5 Darby concerned appeals from individuals convicted for
drug related offenses.265 One of the petitioners, Yamanis, claimed
that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to try him because of the
manner in which he was brought before the court.267 Yamanis
claimed that he was arrested in Honduras and forcibly brought to
the United States by an American agent acting with the assistance
of Honduran officials.268 The court situated the case "squarely within
the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine, which holds that a defendant cannot defeat
personal jurisdiction by asserting the illegality of the procedure of
his presence."26 9
The court then dismissed Yamanis' use of Toscanino, for three
reasons. First, the court concluded that Yamanis did not allege the
treatment that was dispositive in Toscanino.27 ° Second, the court
rejected the "broad" application of Toscanino which Yamanis
urged. 17 ' Finally, the court argued that the validity of Toscanino was
"questionable"2 72 in light of Gerstein v. Pugh,273 where the Supreme
Court affirmed the rule that an illegal arrest does not void a subsequent conviction. 4
264. 896 F.2d at 25. The court suggested that Matta's claim was in effect a request to
create an exclusionary rule of the body, which "might advance marginally some of the
ends served by exclusionary rules, but it would also increase to an intolerable degree
interference with the public interest in having the guilty brought to book." Id. (citing
United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966)).
The Matta court noted there are means by which the United States government
could be deterred from abusive conduct: (1) Matta could file a Bivens action alleging a violation of his due process rights; (2) Matta could request that the case be dismissed for
prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) "complaints from foreign nations of violations of
international law as well as the loss of international standing provide an additional deterrent effect." Id. at 262. But see Wolf v. Colorado 338 U.S. 25, 48 (1949) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) ("There is but one alternative to the rule of exclusion. That is no sanction at

all.").
265. 744 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985).
266. Id. at 1509.
267. Id. at 1530.
268. Id.
269. Id. The court drew support from United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th
Cir. 1974), which rejected, under the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, the claim by a non-resident
alien that his forcible abduction from Peru divested the district court ofjurisdiction.
270. 744 F.2d at 1531.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
274. Id.
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In United States v. Matta,275 the Eleventh Circuit rejected a
claim that the United States violated international law and the Due
Process Clause when its agents allegedly kidnapped Matta from
Honduras and tortured him before transporting him to the United
States.2 7 6 The court wrote first, citing Darby, that the Eleventh

Circuit does not recognize the Toscanino exception to the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine, 277 and second,
that Matta did not allege the brutality that
2 78
occurred in Toscanino.

Part A of this Section levelled three criticisms at the United
States' extradition of defendants to foreign countries: first, the narrow rights of extradition defendants are inappropriately accorded as
a function of the form, not the substance, of extradition proceedings;
second, our extradition jurisprudence unreflectively interprets jurisdictional challenges to extradition as only protecting nations, not
individuals; and third, extradition law wrongfully interprets constitutional protections in extradition proceedings as a function of
United States diplomacy and policy interests, not as expressive of an
independent set of guaranteed rights.
This Section adds to these comments by raising three additional criticisms at the law regarding the United States' acquisition
of foreign defendants: first, the assumptions the extradition law
makes about the critical capacity of foreign nations are unreflective
of both international realities and the United States' role in
constructing those international realities; second, the nature of the
conduct that the courts are sanctioning, regardless of how it is
constitutionally or politically framed, offends "fundamental notions
of fairness"; and third, extraterritorial due process holdings,
combined with emerging political realities, will create an even
wider, less scrutinized window of opportunity for abusive
governmental practices.
Extraterritorial extradition jurisprudence rests on inaccurate
assumptions about the critical role of foreign nations. The specialty
doctrine, as Fiocconi and Diwan held, requires an "official state
protest" by the state on behalf of the individual before the individual's claim is cognizable. History and case law, however, suggest
that it is unlikely that foreign nations will intervene in extradition
proceedings to criticize the United States' policy efforts.
The "official protest" requirement is irrational. First, it is unreflective of the fact that power in the international community is not
distributed evenly; nations are severely imbalanced, both politically
275. 937 F.2d 567 (11th Cir. 1991).
276. Id. at 568.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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and economically. These imbalances, moreover, are perhaps greatest
between the United States and the drug-trafficking countries where
potential abduction targets are likely to be domiciled or in hiding.279
Nations are also imbalanced in terms of their ability to monitor the
conduct of foreign countries;2 0 in addition to the absence of monitoring capabilities, the political and legal culture may make
"protesting" another nation's conduct more likely in some states
than others.
Second, in-addition to the basic power imbalances between nations, many countries are heavily dependent upon United States'
economic and/or military assistance."s The United States has exploited this imbalance. It has forced some countries to comply with
its extradition goals by making policy compliance a prerequisite for
receiving aid.2 82 In short, given the United States' increasing use of
its political and economic leverage, it is simply unlikely that many of
the drug trafficking nations will make a claim on behalf of an indiit may jeopardize
vidual-especially an unwanted criminal-when
3
.2
interests
economic
or
political
their
279. Another factor which makes protest likely is the unwillingness of most
individuals to stand up for the rights of drug traffickers. Common sentiment, both public
and governmental, is that the Drug War should be broadened, not constrained. For the
public, feelings of ftstration about the inefficacy of anti-drug measures, and constant
reminders of that inefficacy in the form of violence and addiction, are taken out on drug
pushers and traffickers. Theoretically, this makes sense. As Freeman and Mensch point
out, "the ideal of public community must be constantly affirmed through the social production of imagery." Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-PrivateDistinctionin
American Law and Life, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 237, 245 (1987). Simply, a great deal of the mobilizing rhetoric in the Drug War has been successful because its objects are both
politically unpopular and defenseless.
Yet in spite of this, or perhaps because of it, we should consider how rights are
affected by public sentiment, which is influenced by matters not directly related to the retraction of individual rights. As deceptive as imagery is, it should not mask the changes
in the actual rights people have. The retributive urge perhaps punishes rights more than
it punishes the guilty person. One theme of this Comment has been that the myths which
inhere in extradition should be stripped away, and the substance, both of extradition proceedings and policy measures, should be analyzed rationally.
280. See generally Zagaris, supra note 34.
281. See generally WISOTSKY, supranote 35.
282. Steven Wisotsky points out a few of these attempts, including a plan proposed
by the Department of Justice permitting Caribbean tax havens to forfeit bank accounts as
the quid pro quo for supplying information leading to the prosecution of drug traffickers
for offenses against the United States. He notes that the United States canceled a tax
treaty with the British Virgin Islands for lack of cooperation on information exchanges.
Furthermore, under the Rangel Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the
President can block the granting of loans by the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development-and the International Development Association to a bank that has not
taken adequate steps to prevent the flow of illegal drugs to the United States. Id.
283.:Mark Sherman writes that, "[ultimately, when a less developed country is
reluctant to cooperate with U.S. international drug control policy, the U.S. wastes no time

674

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

The assumptions that the United States' state-centered extradition jurisprudence makes about the international community are
rendered even less persuasive when considered against the structural changes in international relations, urged by the United States,
which make state protest unlikely.2 The increasing focus on law
enforcement in the Drug War has generated tremendous criticism of
extradition treaties. 5 One such criticism, not surprisingly, has been
directed at specialty provisions, suggesting that treaties can not be
rewritten fast enough to list the changing crimes which might
constitute extraditable offenses. 6 Double criminality requirements
have also been criticized, on the grounds that the laws of many
states vary on the penalties they assign to similar crimes. Since
states do not always agree on exactly what constitutes criminal and
non-criminal conduct, double criminality critics suggest that
alternate international criminal perspectives thwart the international effort to combat drug trafficking.287
in resorting to its substantial bargaining power. Thus, the United States' drug control relationship with many third world countries is actually one of least partial coercion." Mark
Andrew Sherman, United States InternationalDrug Control Policy, Extradition, and the
Rule of Law in Colombia, 15 NOVA L. REV. 661, 664 (1991). The United States and other
Western European governments tend not to utilize the more irregular methods of
rendition against each other. See 28 HarvardConference supra note 5, at 74.
Customary international law maintains limitations on a state's criminal jurisdiction
over the person by the state of nationality of the person. See, e.g., S.S. Lotus (Fr. v.
Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept 7). Generally, only the state of nationality may
bring an international claim for an injury to a particular person. Nottenbohm Case
(Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6); Advisory Opinion No. 4, Reparations for Injuries
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11); see John M.
Rogers, Prosecuting Terrorists: When Does Apprehension in Violation of International
Law PrecludeTrial?,42 U. MAMI L. REV. 447 (1987).
284. What renders these changes somewhat inexplicable is that "Congress has been
far from enthusiastic about extraterritorial arrests and abductions." Lowenfeld, supra
note 36, at 477. But see the evolving history of 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c), supranote 36.
285. See generally Patel, supra note 32, at 709. Extradition was employed almost exclusively against political and religious offenders until the nineteenth century. Since
then, with increased political and religious tolerance, extradition has been recast as a
method of international crime control. See Yvonne G. Grissie, Note, Federally Sponsored
InternationalKidnapping: An Acceptable Alternative to Extradition?, 64 WASH U. L.Q.
1205 (1986); Kenneth S. Sternberg & David L. Skelding, State Department
Determinations of Political Offenses: Death Knell for the Political Offense Exception in
ExtraditionLaw, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 137, 138 (1983).
286. One scholar has commented that "international law has not been as flexible and
as dynamic as either the organized criminals or the narco-terrorists." Zagaris, supra note
34, at 712. It generally takes two to four years to conclude, ratify, and exchange bilateral
extradition treaties. Multilateral treaties take much more time. Id.
287. Double criminality requirements can be interpreted liberally or strictly.
Countries that interpret these requirements liberally do so because, in their view, the
benefits of international cooperation outweigh the impact on sovereignty dictates in this
area. See generally Sicaledes, supra note 63.
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In response to these criticisms, many recent- extradition treaties have been altered. These alterations have included: (1) more
flexible formulas for defining extraditable offenses;2 8 (2) provisions
that conspiracies and criminal attempts constitute extraditable
offenses; 289 (3) changes to better accommodate international law
enforcement efforts, including the movement to outline penal zones
rather than exhaustively list extraditable offenses;90 and (4) proviMost extradition treaties contain no obligation on the part of the host state to deliver

up their own nationals. The current treaty in force between the United States and Italy is
the only one that mandates the extradition of nationals. Extradition Treaty with Italy,

Oct. 13, 1983, U.S.-Italy, art. IV, T.I.A.S. No. 10,837, at 6 ("A Requested Party shall not
decline to extradite a person because such a person is a national of the Requested
Party."). Some treaties, in fact, explicitly bar such extradition. See, e.g., Extradition
Treaty with Mexico, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., art. 9, 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5065 (allowing
narrow discretionary exception). This provision, according to critics, necessarily and disproportionately harms nations like the United States, who are often trying to prosecute
the nationals of other countries.
Finally, "exceptions" constitute another criticized extradition barrier. The political
offense exception allows a requested country to refuse to extradite an individual if it considers the crime for which the individual is charged to be a "political" offense.
Political offenses fit into two broad categories: pure and relative offenses. A
pure political offense is a crime that is directed against the "security and structure of the state" or "the regime of official power," and that contains none of the
elements of a common crime. This category of offenses is limited to treason, espionage, and sedition. Pure political offenses are rarely extraditable crimes.
Relative political offenses are common crimes, such as murder or theft, which
are connected with a political act. These offenses may qualify for the political offense exception.
Michael R. Littenberg, Comment, The PoliticalOffense Exception: An HistoricalAnalysis
and Model for the Future, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1195, 1198 (1990). The exception was based on
three principles: (1) recognition of the legitimacy of political dissent; (2) the desire to protect the political offender from summary execution or delivery to a biased tribunal; and
(3) the belief that the extraditing state should remain detached from the internal affairs
of the requesting state. See generally id.; GILBERT, supra note 67, at 113-82.
A second criticized exception is the "death penalty" exception. Nations may refuse to
extradite an individual if the offense for which the individual is to be extradited is punishable by death in the requesting state. A typical clause is found in Article 11 of the
European Convention on Extradition:
If the offence for which extradition is requested is -punishable by death under
the law of the requesting Party, and if in respect of such offence the death penalty is not provided for by the law of the requested Party or is not normally carried out, extradition may be refused unless the requesting Party gives such assurance as the requested Party considers sufficient that the death penalty will
not be carried out.
European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, art. II, 359 U.N.T.S. 273.
A third exception is the military offense exception. See GILBERT, supra note 67, at
101.
288. See Barnett, supranote 63.
289. Id.
290. For example, finding extraditable crimes that are punishable under the laws of
both nations for more than one year. See id. at 305.
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sions for supplementary apprehension measures. 291 These alterations were uniformly designed to facilitate prosecution.
In short, the assumption extradition/abduction jurisprudence
makes about the intervention of foreign states is flawed given existing power imbalances between states, the United States' use of
economic incentives and disincentives to compel compliance with
policy goals, and the restructuring of extradition treaties around
prosecutorial interests, which effectively limit the bases from which
nation state protest can be sounded.
. The nature of the apprehension tactics the courts are sanctioning also merits criticism. It is currently law within our borders that
the United States can terrorize and torture an individual and still
retain jurisdiction to try him. With the challenge to this law sounded
by Toscanino, the legality of the abuse turns on whether or not the
conduct involved "shocks the conscience." This standard has been
further qualified by Lujan's level-of-force analysis. But torture and
brutality do not need to be framed in constitutional terms to "shock
the conscience"; they are antipathetic to commonly shared values
about how people should be treated. It is frightening to think that
we live in an age where conduct must rise to the abuse Toscanino
suffered before it offends "standards of justice." It is more frightening to think that Toscanino is not the law in many circuits, and has
been eviscerated in the circuit that decided it. The Constitution is
not a static document. It is a challenge to redefine shared political
and legal ideas in light of social changes; it should not interpreted to
make exceptions for behavior violative of those ideas.292
Similarly, regardless of the limitations on judicial inquiry
posed by constitutional or international law, it is troubling to think
that courts will not intervene to protect individuals in cases like
Matta-Balesteros, where abuse surpassing Lujan's level-of-force
hurdle was affirmed simply because there was no state protest.
Nation state protest should not be the floor for intervening on behalf
of an abducted individual-it should be the ceiling. The courts, in
the absence of protest, should intervene on behalf of foreign states to
enforce basic ideas of justice, whether these ideas emanate from our
laws, legal obligations which arise from our relationship with the
involved nations, or international documents. At least they should
calibrate the protest requirement with the political likelihood that
foreign nations would protest. This should include an analysis of a
291. See generally id.
292. It is difficult to conceptualize the state as an entity that can cause harm. "States
do not have their own system of morality; commentators merely judge a State's activities
on the basis of human ideas and ideals of morality." Geoff Gilbert, The Criminal
Responsibility of States, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 345, 348 (1990).
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country's political and economic position with respect to the United
States. Otherwise, a jurisprudential framework arises precisely like
the one the United States has produced; one where tacit complicity
in human rights violations is explained away by citing the
responsibility of other countries to file a claim on behalf of the
affected individual.
Emerging Latin American political trends also raise immediate
questions about the implications of extradition jurisprudence for
future policy practice. Lira, with its arguably high threshold for
establishing government "involvement," creates incentives for United States officials to pursue methods of rendition which exploit the
blind spots in our extradition jurisprudence and public awareness.
Rather than try to articulate a patterned or realistic way of thinking
about governmental involvement abroad, Lira provides a shield for
government officials to work clandestinely with foreign operatives,
and effectively allows extraterritorial policy to skirt both hard legal
analysis and, by extension, the dictates of the Constitution.
Finally, refusal by courts to think realistically about the implications of holdings construing governmental involvement narrowly
is even more problematic given Columbia's decision to make extradition unconstitutional. If other countries follow Colombia's protectionist lead, the only way to acquire nationals from drug-trafficking
countries would be irregular rendition methods, such as persuading
countries to expel drug traffickers."'3 This is dangerous; it will remove governmental conduct farther and farther from points, such as
treaty relationships, that the courts have at least felt comfortable
analyzing. As this Comment illustrates, our vocabulary for considering extraterritorial policy practice is extremely limited, and tends to
marginalize individual claims for protection from governmental
abuse.2 ' Current political trends, if not accompanied by changes in
our constitutional conceptualization of international conduct, will
delimit this vocabulary even further.
Both the United States extradition and acquisition of individuals constitute a narrow view of individual rights. The reasons for
this narrowness are not just philosophically objectionable; they also
proceed, as this Comment has demonstrated, from many inaccurate
293. Countries have resorted to such methods. See supranote 6.
294. One method utilized by the United States, abduction, arguably violates international law because it violates another state's sovereignty. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES allows [1]aw enforcement officers of
the United States [to] exercise their function in the territory of another state
only... with the consent of the other state...." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
REATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 433 (1987). See generally Joel R. Paul, The

Argument Against InternationalAbduction of CriminalDefendants, 6 AM. U. J. INTL L. &
POL'Y 527 (1991) (discussing U.S. abduction of foreign defendants abroad).
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assumptions, ranging from the characterization of the proceedings
to assumptions about participants in those proceedings. It is against
this backdrop that this Comment turns to consider VerdugoUrquidez I, Verdugo-Urquidez H and Alvarez-Machain.

IV. THE VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ AND ALVAREZ-MACHAIN DECISIONS
A.

Verdugo-Urquidez

1295

Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was allegedly a member of a
Mexican drug smuggling organization. 2 ' The United States obtained
a warrant for Verdugo-Urquidez's arrest and in January 1986,
Mexican police officers, after conferring with United States
Marshals, apprehended Verdugo-Urquidez in Mexico and transported him to the United States Border Patrol Station in Calexico,
California, where he was arrested by United States officials. 297 After
his arrest, a DEA agent arranged for Verdugo-Urquidez's Mexican
residences to be searched.298 With Mexican authorities, the DEA
uncovered a tally sheet, which the government believed reflected the
drugs Verdugo-Urquidez smuggled into the United States.2 99 The
District Court granted Verdugo-Urquidez's motion to suppress this
evidence, because the Fourth Amendment applied to the searches
and the DEA agents failed to justify searching Verdugo-Urquidez's
premises without a warrant. 30
In affirming the District Court's decision, the Ninth Circuit
asserted that one purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to constrain
governmental conduct:
'When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the

shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide
to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he
happens to be in another country.'... The Constitution imposes substantive constraints
on the federal government, even when it operates
301

abroad.

Noting that the judiciary has frequently recognized the standing of
non-resident aliens to invoke the protections afforded by the United
295. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 494
U.S. 259 (1990).
296. 856 F.2d at 1215.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1217.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 1217-18 (citations omitted). See Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Reach of the
Bill of Rights Beyond the Terra Firma of the United States, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 741, 745
(1980).
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States Constitution,3 2 the court concluded that the Fourth
Amendment protects non-citizens abroad as well.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Verdugo-Urquidez I was overturned by the Supreme Court. 30 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, found that
'the people' protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and
Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of
conneca national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient
3 4
tion with this country to be considered part of that community.

0

The Court also disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's extraterritorial application of the Constitution, finding the Ninth Circuit's
305
opinion contrary to the Court's decisions in the Insular Cases,
which held that "not every constitutional provision applies to governmental activity even where the United States has sovereign
power."30 6 Further, the Court found unavailing Verdugo-Urquidez's
reliance on cases which accorded constitutional rights to aliens
within the United States,307 because these protections were available
302. 856 F.2d 1214, 1217-19. Courts have held that the Constitution restrains governmental conduct abroad. For example, residents of Australia have standing under the
U.S. Constitution to raise objections to the limitations on liability imposed by the Warsaw
Convention. See In re Aircrash in Bali, Indon. on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1308 n.6
(9th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Demanett, 629 F.2d 862, 866 (3d Cir. 1980)
(assuming that both American citizens and Colombian nationals aboard a vessel on the
high seas are protected by the Fourth Amendment), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981);
Porter v. United States, 496 F.2d 583, 591 (Ct. Cl. 1974) ("The just compensation clause of
the Fifth Amendment has, in fact, been applied to takings of property located outside the
United States, even in the absence of congressional extension of the Constitution to such
foreign soil."), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410
F.Supp 144 (D.D.C. 1976) (discussing exceptions under which non-resident aliens have
standing to sue in U.S. courts).
303. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
304. Id. at 265.
305. Id. at 268. The Insular Cases were a series of decisions dealing with the legal
relationship between the United States and its early twentieth century territories. See
Roszell Dulany Hunter, IV, Note, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the ConstitutionUnalienableRights?, 72 VA. L. REV. 649, 654 (1986).
306. 494 U.S. at 268.
307. Verdugo-Urquidez had relied on Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that
illegal aliens are protected by Equal Protection Clause); Kwong Hal Chew v. Colding, 344
U.S. 590 (1953) (holding that a resident alien is a "person" within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (holding that resident aliens
have First Amendment rights); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481
(1931) (holding that a foreign corporation is entitled to protection under the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S.
228 (1896) (holding that resident aliens are entitled to Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment
protects resident aliens).
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only to aliens who had developed "substantial connections" with the
United States.0 8
This "substantial connections" analysis was used to distinguish
the Ninth Circuit's reliance on INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,0 9 which held
that the Fourth Amendment applied to illegal aliens in the United
States.3 1 The question in Lopez-Mendoza was whether or not the
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule should be extended to civil
deportation proceedings, not whether the protections of the Fourth
Amendment extended to aliens within this country.3 1' Even if the
illegal aliens in Lopez-Mendoza were entitled to the protection of the
Fourth Amendment,
their situation is different than respondent's. The illegal aliens in LopezMendoza were in the United States voluntarily and presumably had accepted some societal obligations; but respondent had no voluntary connection with this country that might place him among "the people" of the

United States.... Not only are history and case law against respondent,
but.., the result of accepting his claim would have significant and delete-

for the United States in conducting activities beyond
rious consequences
312
its boundaries.

The Court predicted that the application of the Fourth Amendment
abroad would (1) disrupt the ability of the political branches to respond to foreign situations involving our national interest; (2) allow
aliens with no attachment to the United States to bring suits
against its authorities; and (3) throw the legislature and the executive branches of government into "a sea of uncertainty as to what
might be reasonable in the way of search and seizures conducted
abroad. 3
In his concurring opinion Justice Kennedy disagreed that the
use of the term "people" in the Fourth Amendment restricted its
protections. 1 4 However, the conditions in Mexico, such as differences
in conceptions of reasonableness and privacy, proscribed the Fourth
Amendment's application there." 5
The dissent emphasized the anomaly that while the United
States is expanding its laws beyond its borders, it is not expanding
3 16
It
its constitutional protections to the people those laws cover.
emphasized that the United States may not act extraterritorially
308. 494 U.S. at 271.
309. 468.U.S. 1032 (1984).
310. Id.

311. 494 U.S. at 272.
312. Id. at 273 (citation omitted).

313. Id. at 273-74.
314. Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
315. Id. at 278.

316. Id. at 279-80 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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without constitutional authority. 1 Nowhere did the majority offer
an explanation of how laws could be expanded abroad without an
equivalent increase in the reach of the Constitution. The dissent
also disagreed that Verdugo-Urquidez had not developed a "sufficient connection" with the United States. 18 The connection was
provided when the United States classified him as a criminal,
and the possibility of
exposing him to its criminal apparatus
3 19
spending the rest of his life in jail.

B.

Verdugo-Urquidez

H320

On March 16, 1988, Verdugo-Urquidez was indicted for various
offenses, including the murder of DEA agent Enrique CamarenaSalazar.3 21 Verdugo-Urquidez moved to dismiss the indictment pursuant to the Mexican-United States Extradition Treaty, alleging
that the individuals who apprehended him were acting at the behest
of the United States government.2 2 The District Court held that the
abduction did not violate the Treaty, because even if the allegations
were accurate, under the Ker-Frisbie doctrine an abduction would
not violate the treaty.3s
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Verdugo-Urquidez claimed that
because his abduction violated the Treaty, the District Court lacked
jurisdiction over him.3 The United States responded that abduction
of an individual fiom another state will not ordinarily bar personal
jurisdiction in a criminal trial, even where there is a valid extradition treaty and the other state lodges a formal protest."
Additionally, 'the Treaty with Mexico did not explicitly prohibit
kidnapping, and individual defendants do not have standing to raise
treaty violation issues before the judiciary.2 8
The court reviewed the Ker-Frisbie doctrine and found it an
open question whether an individual may challenge the United
317. "The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and

authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with the limitations imposed
by the Constitution.'" Id. at 281 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957)).
318. 494 U.S. at 283.
319. Id. at 283-84. The dissent also argued that the Court's sanction of illegal conduct rejected the notion of mutuality, disregarded national values and forgot that the focus of the Fourth Amendment is on what the Government can and cannot do... not
against whom these actions may be taken." Id. at 284-88.
320. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112
S. Ct. 2986 (1992).
321. 939 F.2d at 1343.
322. Id.
323. Id.

324. Id.
325. Id. at 1345.
326. Id.
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States' ability to try him if the United States abducts that individual
from a nation without that nation's consent. 27 The court further
challenged the notion that Ker could be read as allowing jurisdiction
over a defendant "regardless of the circumstances under which he
was brought there."3 2 The court noted that Ker was not a case of

authorized kidnapping and further distinguished the case on the
grounds that in Ker Peru had not lodged a formal complaint while
here Mexico had. 329 Also, Frisbie did not support a broad reading of

Ker because Frisbiehad not involved an extradition
treaty, and was
30
a case of domestic, not international kidnapping.
Because extradition treaties impose mutual obligations, the
court found that the government's contention that it could disregard
an extradition treaty at will contravened the underlying purpose of
extradition treaties.3 31 State-supported kidnapping violated interna-

tional law because it breached the sovereignty of the affected nation.3 32 Further, the court found that in addition to protecting the

sovereignty of signatories, extradition treaties also insure fair
treatment of individuals. The court held that
extradition treaties provide a comprehensive means of regulating the
methods by which one nation may remove an individual from another nation for the purpose of subjecting him to criminal prosecution, and that
unless the nation from which an individual has been forcibly abducted
consents to that act in advance, or subsequently by its silence or otherwise
waives its right to object, a government
authorized or sponsored abduction
33 3
constitutes a breach of treaty.

The court also saw no reason why the specialty rule should not
apply in the case of a government-authorized or sponsored kidnapping that violates an extradition treaty.
[T]he rule which permits an individual defendant to raise a treaty violation as a basis for precluding the exercise of personal jurisdiction in a specialty case is equally applicable in a government authorized or sponsored
kidnapping case, the only difference being that in the kidnapping case
there must be a formal protest from the offended government after the
kidnapping, while in the specialty case, some circuits (including ours) the
foreign government's original statement
of limitation is deemed sufficient
334
to constitute the requisite protest.

327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 1345-46.
330. Id at 1347.
331. Id. at 1349-50.
332. Id. at 1352.

333. Id. at 1355.
334. Id. at 1356-57. The court wrote that "[ojur decisions involving the principle of
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Finding the government's actions in violation of the treaty and
international law, it next addressed the issue of the proper role of
the executive and the judiciary in extradition hearings. It started by
noting that Congress had placed supervision of the extradition process in the unique province of the courts. It also rejected the arguments that the legality of Verdugo-Urquidez' abduction was a nonjusticiable political question, and that its decision was significantly
expanding the role of courts in the field of foreign relations.115 Thus
the Ninth Circuit provided one of the few judicial refusals to surrender the protection of individual rights to the purview of the
Executive branch.
In conclusion the court forecasted the impact on American citizens if it found the Verdugo-Urquidez abduction lawful: "Were we to
hold.., that the United States may invade the sovereign territory of
Mexico and kidnap an individual without violating this nation's
treaty obligations, it would follow inexorably that no treaty bar
exists to similar acts by foreign governments against citizens of the
United States."3 6 Thus the court forcefully insisted that any "new
world order in which the use of force is to be subject to the rule of
law... must begin by holding our own government to its fundamental legal commitments."" '
C.

Alvarez-Machain

The reasoning of Verdugo-Urquidez II was effectively overruled
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Alvarez-Machain.3 Dr.
Alvarez-Machain was a citizen of Mexico indicted for participating
in the kidnap and murder of United States Drug Enforcement special agent Enrique Camarena Salazar." 9 Dr. Alvarez-Machain reportedly kept Salazar alive so he could be tortured and interrogated. 3 0 On April 2, 1990, Alvarez-Machain was forcibly kidnapped
from his medical office and flown to Texas, where he was arrested by
DEA officials.3 41 Alvarez-Machain moved to dismiss the indictment,
claiming that his abduction constituted outrageous governmental
conduct, and that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to try him
because his abduction violated the United States-Mexico extradition
specialty make clear that in those cases at least 'the person extradited may raise
whatever objections the rendering country may have.'" Id. at 1355 (quoting United States

v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986).
335. 939 F.2d at 1357.
336. Id. at 1362.
337. Id.

338. 112 S.Ct 2188 (1992).
339. Id. at 2190.
340. Id.
341. Id.
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treaty.'
The District Court agreed that his abduction violated the
United States-Mexico extradition treaty, and ordered that AlvarezMachain be repatriated to Mexico.m3 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the indictment and the repatriation of respondent,
relying on its decision in Verdugo-Urquidez I.
Reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court began by
noting that
our first inquiry must be whether the abduction of respondent from Mexico
violated the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. If
we conclude that the Treaty does not prohibit respondents abduction, the
rule in Ker applies, and the court need not inquire as to how respondent
came before it.344
For two reasons, the Court found that the treaty did not prohibit the forcible abduction of Mexican citizens. The Court wrote,
"[t]he treaty says nothing about the obligations of the United States
and Mexico to refrain from forcible abductions of people from the
territory of other nations, or the consequences under the treaty if
such an abduction occurs." and that "[tihe history of negotiation and
practice under the treaty also fails to show that abductions outside
of the Treaty constitute a violation of the Treaty."34 5 The Court
concluded that
to infer from this treaty and its terms that it prohibits all means of gaining the presence of an individual outside of its terms goes beyond established precedent and practice. In Rauscher,the implication of a doctrine of
speciality into the terms of the Webster-Ashburton treaty which, by its
terms, required the presentation of evidence establishing probable cause
of the crime of extradition before extradition was required, was a small
step to take. By contrast, to imply from the terms of this Treaty that it
prohibits obtaining the presence of an individual by means outside of the
procedures the Treaty requires a much larger inferential leap, with only
the most general of international law principles to support it. The general
principles cited by respondent simply fail to persuade us that we should
imply in the United
States Extradition Treaty a term prohibiting interna346
tional abductions.
In dissent Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority that the
Treaty was not comprehensive.3 47 He explained that the Treaty's
language, as well as the interest in construing treaties to reduce
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 2193..
345. Id. at 2193-94.
346. Id. at 2196.
347. Id. at 2198 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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international conflict, both counseled reading the Treaty to prohibit
state-sponsored abduction.38 Next he illustrated how Rauscher
limited the offenses for which an individual could be 'prosecuted,
even though no such limitation was found at in the extradition
treaty at issue. 9 Recognizing the instability of Rauscher since it
was decided, Stevens noted that the international community
"condemns one Nation's violation of the territorial integrity of a
friendly nation."3 51 He concluded by critizing the majority for not
distinguishing between governmental and non-governmental forms
of kidnapping and for disregarding the practical and symbolic consequence of not binding the executive to the rule of law.35 1

V. THE BALANCE BETWEEN POLICY OBJECTIVES AND INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS

A.

The Implications of Verdugo-Urquidez and Alvarez-Machain

A combination of elements, including the sense of international
urgency about stopping the drug problem, the existing lack of protections in the extradition process, and the changes in extradition
jurisprudence and rendition practice, have resulted in a balance
which clearly favors policy interests and prosecutorial efficiency at
the expense of individual rights.5 2 Practically, this provides individuals in extradition proceedings with almost no recourse to the
procedural and substantive protections embodied. in our laws. It
says that brutality against individuals is permissible, and that extreme brutality can be sanctioned through the invocation of technicalities of international relations. It also says that the courts,
charged with monitoring the behavior of the other branches of government, are not willing to do so, even in the face of misuse of the
process. The life of extradition jurisprudence has been an exercise
not in forcing government to comply with the spirit which inheres in
the Constitution, but rather in constructing exceptions to its
reach.353
348. Id. at 2198-99.
349. Id. at 2200.
350. Id. at 2201 (citations omitted).
351. Id. at 2203-06.
352. Bassiouni points out that "restrictions, limitations, or defenses which exist
under extradition law are not, with a few exceptions, primarily designed for the benefit of
the individual, instead they are designed to inure to the benefit of states involved."
BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 563.
353. Inquiring into extradition and abduction jurisprudence raises the difficult
question of how, apart from formulaic political positions, one can create a flexible
jurisprudence around the tension between policy objectives and individual rights. Trying
to define individual rights against a situation that is purportedly for the public good has
been a common difficulty throughout our legal history. The classical way of thinking
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Examining the nature of this balance-or, more appropriately,
this imbalance-requires us to face our guiding political and legal
values." Most, if not all, extradition jurisprudence stems not from
an analysis of the relationship between legal rules and our legal and
social traditions, but rather is the product of the utilitarian notion
that extradition and abduction are simply tools which further state
interests. Extradition and abduction are not seen by the courts as
independent expressions of legal or political values. Yet despite their
characterization, they are expressive of values about the legal process and about individuals. The Tenth Amendment not only allocates
duties to federal and state governments, 355 but it is also a normative
statement about the boundaries of governmental conduct. Its existence and interpretation are a continuing public statement about
how our lives can be lived and what protections we can enjoy. It is
also a statement about our political culture: the interaction between
the government and its citizens and how authority is exercised.
Verdugo-Urquidez I will have an immediate impact on this
balance. First, the decision explicitly limits the class of persons protected by the Constitution, and flatly states that the Fourth
Amendment applies only to individuals with "substantial connec3 6
tions" to the United StatesY.
This holding fits squarely into the
parade of holdings retracting Fourth Amendment protections,3 57 and
makes it possible to further remove rights of individuals in areas
like extradition, which involve people who, by definition, lack
"substantial connections" to the United States. It also continues lock
step with Fernandez and other extradition holdings which apply
protections as a function of the form, not the substance of institutional proceedings. The Court's entire constitutional analysis flowed
from one element: Verdugo-Urquidez's citizenship. More broadly,
Verdugo-Urquidez I could undermine the ratio decidendi of cases
about the problem has been to presume that good conduct can not lead to harmful
consequences. But it can. The question is how to think about integrating actions done for
public good with both short and long- term harms that may inure to individuals. There is
a danger that granting of authority for short-term social reasons will have long-term
implications on the relationship between the government and the governed. The
authority grant becomes the foothold upon which an institution can assert its autonomy.
See Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRTIQUE 30 (David Kairys ed., 1982).

354. See generally Philip B. Heymann, Two Models of National Attitudes Toward
International Cooperation in Law Enforcement, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 99, 104 (1990)
(describing a "prosecutorial" model and an "international law" model).
355. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST., amend. X.
356. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990).
357. See supra note 3.
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which have held that foreign nationals do have rights under our
Constitution.
Second, Verdugo-UrquidezI effectively rules that constitutional
protections are entitlements for a class of privileged persons, not a
restraint on government conduct. 58 In construing the Constitution
to affirm a specific governmental act, the Court has arguably turned
its back on much of what the Constitution stands for, and it has
done so at a time when extraterritorial governmental conduct is
increasingly a fact of daily life. Additionally, the rationale that the
Constitution regulates governmental conduct vis-a-vis entitled citizens, does not protect even United States citizens. It teaches that
the courts will sanction otherwise proscribed conduct if it is directed
at a geographically "constructed" class of defenseless persons.29
Third, the Court effectively exempted diplomacy from constitutional scrutiny, elevating the national diplomatic effort to constitutionally protected conduct. The platform upon which this exemption
was built merits scrutiny. Although the debate is not settled about
the deference our Constitution should accord to diplomacy and other
acts of national interest, Verdugo-Urquidez Ts arguments about the
effect of applying the Fourth Amendment abroad are not compelling.
Applying the Fourth Amendment abroad would not "disrupt the
ability of the political branches to respond to foreign situations
involving our national interest."360 It would simply require that
pursuit of our national interest be consistent with our Constitution.
Extraterritorial Fourth Amendment application would not "allow
aliens with no attachment to the United States to bring actions for
damages" against the United States.36 ' It would simply provide
courts with the opportunity to review the government's extraterritorial conduct, develop ways to think carefully about that conduct, and
insure that that conduct comports with our laws. Furthermore,
applying the Fourth Amendment abroad would not throw the
executive and legislative branches of government into a "sea of
uncertainty as to what might be reasonable in the way of search and
358. Nothing in the Constitution limits or defines its geographical reach. The text
itself begs the question of its scope, using the word "person" or "people" at times, and
"citizen" at others. For general discussions of the reach of the Constitution, see Gerald L.
Neuman, Whose Constitution?,100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991); Louis Henkin, The Constitution
as Compact and as Conscience, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11 (1985); Jules Lobel, The
ConstitutionAbroad, 83 AM.-J. INT'L L. 871 (1989); C.M.A. McCauliff, The Reach of the
Constitution: American Peace-Time Court in West Berlin, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 682
(1980); Saltzburg, supra note 301; Hunter, supranote 305.
359. For a general discussion about various models of extraterritorial constitutional
jurisprudence, see Neuman, supranote 358.
360. Verdugo-Urquidez I, 494 U.S. at 273.
361. Id.
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seizures conducted abroad." 62 To the contrary, it would apply the
clearest directive on foreign conduct: the Constitution shall not be
abrogated. While diplomacy and foreign policy efforts are certainly
valid state endeavors, they should be analyzed in light of and held to
constitutional strictures, not used to redefine them.
Practically, Verdugo-Urquidez I may sound the end of the
Toscanino exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. Throughout its
evisceration, Toscanino's central element has been the legitimacy of
scrutinizing governmental conduct abroad, irrespective of who was
the object of that conduct. But with the Supreme Court's pronouncement that foreign nationals cannot assert constitutional
claims, even against otherwise unconstitutional conduct, this element of the Toscanino inquiry may be abandoned. This would leave
Toscanino with nothing to support it.
Verdugo-Urquidez I, in conjunction with Lira and the judiciary's incremental raising of both standing hurdles and the threshold
for demonstrating "governmental involvement," creates further incentive for governmental officials to be enterprising in gaining both
evidence and the body of suspected criminals. The less the legal
costs of irregular rendition are, the greater the likelihood that the
Executive will utilize these methods to secure foreign policy goals.
Alvarez-Machain will also effect the individual rights/policy
objective balance. The Court said that "[i]f we conclude that the
Treaty does not prohibit respondent's abduction, the rule in Ker
applies, and the court need not inquire as to how respondent came
before it."" Thus, the Court suggested that (a) either the Toscanino
exception to the Ker-Frisbie exception is not" good law or (b) an
abduction is not sufficiently "shocking to the conscience" to trigger
the Toscanino exception.
Beyond what may be the demise of the Toscanino exception to
the Ker-Frisbie rule, Alvarez-Machain presents what may be the
most extreme example of "instrumental" treaty reading in extradition/abduction cases. The development of the specialty and double
criminality doctrines clearly indicates a trend in extradition jurisprudence to look beyond the letter of treaties when searching for
their meaning. However, without responding to these jurisprudential developments, the Court simply noted that it would require a
"much larger inferential leap" to infer a prohibition against using
3
means outside of the treaty provisions. 6
This misconstrues Alvarez-Machain's argument. His argument
was not that the Treaty prohibits all means outside of those re362. Id. at 274

363. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2193 (1992).
364. Id. at 2196.
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quired by the Treaty. There are means of rendition which, although
not specifically mentioned, may fall within the Treaty. The legality
of these means would depend upon a careful consideration of U.S.
law and the specific nature of the means chosen. Rather, AlvarezMachan's argument was that the Treaty prohibited one specific
means-abduction.
Second, the Court apparently forgot a strand of jurisprudence
that has been repeatedly used to resolve other extradition claims in
favor of the government-the notion that extradition treaties safeguard states', not individuals', rights. The Court conveniently forgot
that the largest state safeguard to be observed and protected when
reviewing the extradition process is the notion of state sovereignty.
The abduction clearly violated Mexico's sovereignty.
Third, the Alvarez-Machain decision is also depressing for the
way in which the Court reached its decision. Irrespective of its holding, the Court spent no time discussing an extremely complex area
of law-the intersection of foreign policy, domestic law, human
rights and international law. Even before the Alvarez-Machain
decision, this intersection is something the courts have not carefully
or adequately addressed. One reason for this is the inflexibility of
our extradition/abduction jurisprudence itself. Alvarez-Machain was
an opportunity to make jurisprudential strides forward; instead, by
defending the abduction, the Court took strides backward.
B.

Verdugo-Urquidez H as the Beginnings of a Model

Verdugo-Urquidez II provides at least the beginnings of a
workable model for thinking about the issues raised in the VerdugoUrquidez I and Alvarez-Machain decisions. First, Verdugo-Urquidez
11 broke from a lengthy tradition of unilaterally favoring the government in extradition and abduction cases. In providing a much
needed criticism of the static and one-dimensional nature of extradition jurisprudence, it served as a positive statement about the value
of individual rights.
Second, Verdugo-Urquidez H provided a criticism of the almost
carte blanche use of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. It distinguished
authorized from unauthorized kidnapping as a matter of law and
also questioned the relevance of Frisbie in international matters
involving treaties. This stopped what, for decades, had been an
almost uninterrupted support of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. It also
provided a more effective criticism of the doctrine than Toscanino,
because it criticized the legitimacy and scope of the doctrine itself,
rather than only trying to provide narrow exceptions to its reach.
Additionally, by distinguishing between different types of
kidnapping, Verdugo-Urquidez 1I evinced a willingness to think
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flexibly and critically about our government's overseas conduct. This
willingness to examine extraterritorial governmental conduct
critically could serve as an impetus for the judiciary to create a more
advanced vocabulary for framing and addressing difficult
international-domestic problems.
Verdugo-Urquidez H also took a stride forward for individual
rights by relying on the understanding that principles of international law are implicitly incorporated into extradition treaties.
Despite the rhetoric that treaties are the "law of the land," most
courts have analyzed extradition treaties as contracts between sovereign nations." 5 As such, these "contracts" have been construed as
incorporating nothing but the expressed will of the contracting parties, and have been used to defend the overt practice of one of the
parties. While Mexico's protest indicated that the contract had been
breached, the holding that the United States also violated international law could have been used to more carefully scrutinize the
overall contract relationship defined by treaties and its effect on
individuals. This type of contractual analysis could pave the way for
third party review of international covenants, which may become
consequential in the future if international organizations are
granted more legal authority.
This possibility-that concerns apart from those positively
expressed by sovereigns may be used to examine the nature of the
relationship of the sovereigns-could also affect other elements of
extradition jurisprudence. One impact may involve a theoretical
reconsideration of the double criminality and specialty doctrines.
The interpretation of these doctrines may start emphasizing their
letter. Further, just as contracts between private parties are
analyzed for their effect on the public interest, so should treaties, if
courts interpret them as contracts, be analyzed for their effect on the
international public interest.
If treaties can be subjected to broader types of contractual
analysis, we might also reexamine the process of treaty interpretation and its place within international and national law. Currently
international treaty interpretation is arguably more political than
legal; treaty provisions are often seen as fungible requirements that
can later be reinterpreted unilaterally, if it suits a given nation's
political interest. But, as treaty interpretation is more clearly seen
as having an impact beyond the scope of the contracting states, perhaps the international legal community will take a greater interest
in monitoring the behavior of states relative to the contractual
provisions to which they agree to be bound.
Second, if claims could be based on sources-such as interna365. See supra part HI.B.

1993]

EXTRADITION AND ABDUCTION

tional law-which are opposed to the contractual preferences of the
sovereigns involved, there is theoretically no reason why individual
rights should be seen as merely "derivative" of states' rights. Once
nation state claims to legal exclusivity in international matters are
challenged, and international norms affect contractual outcomes,
individual claims against international sovereign practice could also
become viable. This process of challenging state exclusivity might be
seen as doctrines like double criminality and specialty, change from
being screens for governmental conduct to an affirmative way to
build both international and individual values into international
practice.
Verdugo-Urquidez H also represented a rare assertion of the
judiciary's role as monitor of the extraterritorial practice of the executive branch. The judiciary has the authority both to directly give
substance to the individual rights implicated in the extradition
process and to effectively grant individual protection by restraining
governmental conduct. Jurisprudentially, this authority stems both
from the court's duty not to subject an individual to conditions that
would "offend fundamental standards of decency" 66 and the fact that
governmental conduct is never completely insulated from judicial
review.6 7 For the most part, courts have chosen not to exercise this
authority, in deference to the diplomatic effort and because the
judiciary has insulated itself from individual rights' inquiries by
placing the practical burden of asserting individual rights claims on
foreign nations. 68
Verdugo-UrquidezII, however, suggested that the government's
self-monitoring of its own policy initiatives is simply not constructing either acceptable domestic policy or acceptable international
precedent. Verdugo-Urquidez I's proclamation that law is not the
shortest path between two policy points may have also had an impact on our legal culture. Courts could have considered the limitations that inhere in trying to evaluate governmental conduct, and
accordingly thought of better ways to evaluate that conduct. This
effort at reformation could include a variety of efforts, ranging from
direct appellate review in extradition proceedings to reconstituting
individual protections to giving courts more authority over the extradition process.
Verdugo-Urquidez I and Alvarez-Machain forcefully raise the
broader issue of the nature of the relationship between law maker
and law. Professor Allott has noted that
366. Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960).
367. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F.Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).

368. Yarnold suggests that extradition is an area where judges can innovate. See
Yarnold, supra note 5, at 23.
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law is objective or it is not law. Law obliges or it is not law. If the subjects
of the law are able to regard their interpretation and application of the
law as a matter for their judgment, the law is not an objective limitation
on their behavior. If the subjects of the law are able to regard law as dependent upon their will to enforce it, the law is not an obligation but
merely a possibility
of action. In either case, this is the form but not the
3 69
reality of law.

How willing is the United States to be governed by rules or values
which are not in its own immediate self-interest? If it is not willing,
this raises questions about the basis of our government's authority.
To what degree is our government premised upon the use of force
and political strength under the guise of law? Our society is too large
to effectively monitor everything that government does, or conversely, everything that individuals do. The government expects
that individuals will be largely self-policing, and thus that laws will
be self-enforcing. We should expect the same of government. And
perhaps we should examine which areas of government are monitoring themselves adequately and which are not. This kind of inquiry is
even more important given the constant expansion of activity into
areas the law has not addressed before. In addition to expanding
geographically, the law is also expanding in other areas, such as in
pre-conception torts. New social facts and correspondingly new social agendas and programs, simply because of their novelty, should
not be used as excuses for skirting legal principles.
The rule of law debate also raises important and timely ethical
questions. Conservative anti-crime rhetoric characteristically laments the loss of morals and the absence of a coherent and followed
moral social code. The solution to this problem, then, is seen as encouraging or coercing compliance with often not universally shared
moral values. Yet the government itself is not willing to follow the
moral code it forces on others. It exempts itself from its own moral
imperatives-such as the belief that people should not be assaulted,
abducted or tortured-when in its own interest to do so. As the majority in Verdugo-Urquidez H pointed out, if this is law, there in
nothing legally to stop foreign countries from abducting and torturing our--own citizens. This problem, however, is not even being addressed, largely because of the judiciary's refusal to situate, in a
patterned way, governmental conduct within a broader legal, much
less ethical, construct. Verdugo-Urquidez H represented a step
toward criticizing law as a tool to justify governmental exercise of
power.
Perhaps the thinking in Verdugo-Urquidez II could be used to
encourage a reconceptualization of the extradition process itself.
369. Allott, supranote 174, at 22.

1993]

EXTRADITION AND ABDUCTION

693

Extradition is a mixed proceeding. It is uneasily caught between
classification as a criminal and non-criminal trial, it is uneasily
caught between the judicial and executive branches, and its objects
are uneasily caught, as potential claimants of legal protections,
between aliens and citizens. And while the mixed nature of extradition practice logically calls out for mixed rights, courts have not
attempted to fashion an enlightened extradition jurisprudence, but
rather have created*extradition law by mechanically applying other
legal principles. Laws have been unreflectively spliced together
which misperceive the extradition process, misperceive the government's use of the extradition process, and misperceive or do not acknowledge the changing macrological conditions which are altering
the significance of that process. While extradition is not a criminal
trial, it is not completely unlike a criminal trial, as suggested earlier. Too long has extradition law been constituted by form-the
perceived form of the process, the perceived form of the political
relationships which inhere in extradition proceedings, and the
status of the affected individual. It is simply time that extradition
jurisprudence be brought up to speed with extradition realities.
Second, the mixed nature of extradition proceedings has also
resulted in a very narrow and outdated notion of "harm." Harm
under current extradition jurisprudence is a completely legal construction; it arises through and can only be legitimized by glaring
factual harm combined with a bona fide state protest. What defines
harm is not who extradition proceedings affect the most: the extradited individual. Harm should be broadened to include the actual
factual harm defendants suffer-the sum total of the seizure and
taking of the person. One way to push the legal definition of harm
back toward its factual reality would be to lower the standing hurdles individuals currently fact. Courts should also consider the notion of harm caused by state practice. If, as Van Den Wyngaert
points out, there is no theoretical reason why principles of the
criminal law can not be applied to states, 370 then we should think
more carefully about the consequences of abusive state practice,
both in terms of its effect on individuals and the international community, and develop effective sanctions to stop those abuses. Thus,
the realities of extradition and abduction practice should lead to a
refashioning of the principles which are used to evaluate those processes and the individuals those processes affect.
Finally, it is important to comment that despite VerdugoUrquidez ITs reasoning, its force as a safeguard of individual rights
from governmental misconduct, and its value as a statement against
the majority of cases .that have come before it, was in some a limited
370. See Van Den Wyngaert, supra note 135.
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one. First, Verdugo-Urquidez H involved a claim of a treaty violation, not a due process violation. Second, the decision may be limited
to its rare facts. Verdugo-Urquidez II was factually the perfect
plaintiffs case because it involved (a) an abduction, (b) in circumvention of a treaty, and (c) a formal protest by the affected nation.
As this Comment has demonstrated, most claims rarely rise to a
similar level of prima facie strength. Some element will typically be
missing: the state affected will not be deemed to have "protested";
the government will not be deemed to have been 3"involved";
the
71
abuse will not be deemed to have been severe enough.
A reexamination of extradition and abduction should consider
the functions of these processes. 2 What is being served, in extradition, by simply one-dimensionally looking at extradition as not a
criminal trial but a procedure which simply transfers a person from
one jurisdiction to another? If the controlling ends of extradition are
diplomacy and deference to efforts in the national foreign interest,
perhaps we should examine more carefully the types of claims which
are grouped under the diplomacy umbrella. Do all diplomatic objectives warrant foregoing the application of broader protections in
extradition proceedings? Are all diplomatic objectives valid? Are
there better ways that the goals of diplomacy could be furthered? In
short, we should examine what constitutes diplomacy and we should
compute the costs of furthering diplomatic interests.
A similar analysis could be undertaken with regard to abduction. What are the costs and benefits of abduction? Might there be
more efficient ways to conduct the Drug War, and apprehend foreign
defendants, which pose less of a threat to our constitutional jurisprudence? For example, if current laws prohibit efficient criminal
prosecution, perhaps more resources should be spent on creating
alternative, possibly international, courts of criminal jurisdiction.
Finally, it is also important to think about the balance between
rights and policy in light of admittedly valid national policy goals.
371. Verdugo-Urquidez !!'s ruling that sufficient facts were alleged to constitute
abduction arguably sounds a more expansive definition of governmental "involvement"
than the courts have applied in the past. Cf United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2nd Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
372. These concerns generally have been levelled at the drug war. See RICARD
POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW (1977). The fact that extradition is considered a
"hybrid" process also poses some interesting questions under Posner's analysis. First, it is
hard to classify the interests of the "state" in the proceeding and thus somewhat difficult
to gauge how well the procedure is working. Second, it raises questions about the value of
other elements such as, for example, "morality." Posner notes that "moral principles-honesty, truthfulness, trustworthiness, selflessness, charity, neighborliness, avoidance of
negligence and coercion-serve in general to promote efficiency." Id. at 185. These quali-

ties have worth, but it is hard to build them into jurisprudence because the benchmark
against which they are balanced is vague.
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Drug trafficking is a serious problem and governments should be
granted the authority to take innovative measures to stop it. Just as
our Constitution should not be adverse to protecting people from
new harms, it should also not strike down legislative or executive
innovation simply because the form of the activity is novel. The
question is again one of balance: How can the twin goals of problem
solving and the preservation of individual protections be preserved?
Further, to what degree is the legal system trying, or even capable,
of asking these kinds of questions? 3 73 To what degree do these legal
inabilities make rational political inquiry impossible?374 While
answering these questions systematically is beyond the scope of this
Comment, these are questions that should be addressed.
VI. EXTRADITION, ABDUCTION AND THE DYNAMICS OF RIGHTS
DISCOURSE

The lessons of extradition and abduction jurisprudence also
provide theoretical occasion to examine the way in which individual
rights are claimed, formed and altered. There is a current jurisprudential myth that there is no concept of individual rights in international law. The practical consequence of this in extradition law has
been that individual rights are "derivative" of states' rights." 5 This
373. Some scholars do not feel that the legal system is capable of asking these kinds
of questions. Pierre Schlaag has written:
The power of traditional legal discourse to repress inquiry into its own form is
awesome. Not only does traditional legal discourse repress its own form (at both
the formal and substantive levels), but having accomplished this repression, it
then conveniently "forgets" that there has been any repression of form at all.
Having thus dismissed rhetoric and form from the stage, having instituted this
dismissal in its very own rhetorical form, and finally having "forgotten" both of
these moves, it is no wonder that traditional legal discourse cannot recognize its
own politics.
Pierre Schlaag, "Le hors de texte, c'est moi": The Politics ofForm and the Domesticationof
Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1631, 1634 (1990).
374. This question resembles the problem of the extent to which institutions are
capable of reflecting on these questions. One scholar has pointed out that the institutionalization of political and legal life has had negative effects on our capacity for real societal
self-reflection. Particularly, he cites the problems with the judiciary monitoring the federal government.
Very few governmental decisions have any serious potential for judicial scrutiny. Even at the height of the era of economic due process-the era of the
greatest, or at least the broadest, judicial activism--only a tiny fraction of governmental action was actually subject to serious judicial review let alone at risk
of invalidation. As a general matter, the courts pose no threat to most governmental resolutions of societal issues.
Neil K. Komesar, A Job for the Judges: the Judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive
and Complex Society, 86 MICH.L. REV. 657 (1988). Limited also is the individual ability to
participate in this process. See id. at 673.
375. Professor Allott notes that "[t]here are no fundamental rights in international
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is untrue. While perhaps not explicitly defined in covenants, or
enforced by courts or international tribunals, international individual rights exist in practice, and are, in effect, defined by the practice
of individual nations, whether that practice is deemed acceptable or
not. Rights are not only the sum total of positive statements-they
3 6
are also the product of practice beneath those statements. 1
Scholars have pointed out that privacy rights, for example, are not
defined only by the positive documents, such as the Constitution or
statutes, that define their scope; they are also constructed by changing cultural conditions, regardless of whether those conditions are
reflected in the positive expressions of privacy rights or not." Thus,
international individual rights, even if only defined negatively, do
exist. As this Comment discussed, if one looks to positive or negative
conceptions of individual rights, as defined by extradition and abduction law or practice, those rights are extremely limited.
Given thus the ability of international practice to define individual rights, it is logical to consider the degree to which international practice is monitored as a process which defines the scope of
rights qua rights. This monitoring is even more imperative given
the evaluative capacity of the international state system. The backdrop of the international drug war, the international arena, constitutes an effective.rights "vacuum": a situation in which there is
neither a clear rights framework defensibly independent of international practice and no formal apparatus which has the authority to
monitor the behavior of other nations. 3 There is also no tribunal
with the authority or power to force nations to respect international
covenants, much less any definitions of individual rights. The absence of clearly defined and observed rights or international bodies
empowered to monitor the rights that are being defined constitutes a
potentially dangerous situation, because it can allow a relatively
small percentage of the international community to, in effect, define
39
what rights will be observed internationally.
society. There are only peremptory norms." Allott, supra note 174, at 20.
376. Yet our perception of righs changes is often tied to the form of those changes.
"Labelling changes as procedural makes them easier to accept but also obscures the
substantive changes that are taking place." Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse,
ProfessionalLanguage and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking,101 HARV. L.
REV. 727, 728 (1988).
377. See Alan Freeman & Betty Mensch, The Public-PrivateDistinctionin American
Law and Life, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 237 (1987).
378. There are many time periods when great legal changes have been made possible
through large structural changes in society. For one analysis of such changes, see
MORTON J. HORwrTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
379. "States almost exclusively constitute the present international order." Gordon
A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: GuardingInterests Fundamentalto InternationalSociety, 28
VA. J. INTL L. 585, 588 (1988). This definition is also significant due to its precedential
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The rapid jump of the modern Drug War from the fragmented
efforts of nations to a malleable and legally relatively unsurveilled
international forum has created a vortex in which the adversarial
gravity which surrounds most issues has not had a chance to develop, work its course, and act as critical dialogue between supporters of opposing interests. This adversarial gravity is central to
Western jurisprudence because it creates precedent and allows competing groups, rather than a single group, to debate over the meaning and scope of law. It also allows the direction of law to be observed and constructively directed in light of experience. However,
unlike domestic legal systems, there is simply no adversary in the
international legal community to balance the policy objectives of
other nations.8 0
The implications of the absence of a real adversarial process in
the international community extends far beyond specific guarantees
of individual rights or the critical ability of foreign nations. In effect,
extraterritorial governmental conduct, free of scrutiny, may be constructing an international social contract, with both individuals and
foreign nations. This Comment has examined, in part, what rights
are being accorded to individuals in this contract. But we also
should inquire as to what rights are being assigned to foreign nations. The rights nations are being functionally assigned by the
increasing creation of an international social contract are disturbing, in part, because for a foreign nation to assert its rights it must
protest. And yet, at the same time, the United States, through economic, political or military pressure, is pressuring countries to comply with its goals and not to protest-not to assert their role in
creating the international social contract. In short, what defines
rights under the emerging international social contract is not, as the
Bush Administration argued, the rule of law, but rather the use of
impact. These legally defined steps can become the basis for other trends in the law.
380. One reason for this is time. The internationalization of many problems has
occurred in a fraction of the time that it has taken most legal systems to develop and respond in a reasoned way to those problems. While law enforcement has become more internationalized, the experience of the United States in dealing with transnational crime
is recent and unsystematic. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Role of the United States in the
InternationalEnforcement of CriminalLaw, 31 HARV. INTL L.J. 37 (1990). A second reason for the creation of a rights vacuum has been the setting of the international drug 'war.
The interstate arena is simply not equipped, jurisdictionally or practically, to make inquiries into the ramifications of the freewheeling nature of the Drug War and its effect on
international individual rights. Our adversary system was built upon the value of
encouraging a constant clash of articulated interests. The theory is that through the combat of mutually exclusive positions, both factual truth as well as a reasoned legal rule
would eventually emerge. Both of these products, factual truth and legal rules, are in
turn tested over time and clarified and reconstructed in light of continuing social
developments and legal criticism.
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power. Further, the power imbalances solidified by this contract
may be hidden under the rhetoric of the benefits that the new world
order will bring.
This development raises questions about the precedential effect
the emerging social contract will have. Precedent does more than
define law. It influences juridical direction and constructs the basis
from which law is discussed and legal values are imputed. To what
degree is governmental extraterritorial conduct setting jurisprudential trends which will be difficult to alter later? Will abduction
become a normal component of interstate political relations? Will
defining law as a function of state self-interest undermine aspirations for transcendent international norms, such as jus cogens? Also,
one might consider whether the normal structure of political discourse-between the individual and the state-is being replaced by
a dialogue between states. If this is a natural consequence of the
internationalization of the world, it is important to inquire how
representative states are of individuals, and what role individuals
have in constituting the discourse between states. If one takes extradition jurisprudence as a model for the critical role of individuals
in international state discourse, the legitimacy of the dialogue
should be questioned. As this Comment has demonstrated, individuals have been completely blocked from monitoring state practice.
Finally, the lesson of how theoretical contracts with nations
and individuals are effectively formed and, within that construct,
how rights are constructed, raises a broader question. What do
rights mean? One way to think about individual rights claims is
simply as a way of demanding a set of desired conditions in which to
live. The practical path to achieve these conditions has historically
been a process of asserting the collective will against the state, or a
sovereign, or other individuals, by legitimizing individual claims to
autonomy. While there is disagreement on the meaning of rights
claims, rights at least are directed at insuring the existence of a
certain set of conditions, be those conditions freedom from oppression or a right to food and shelter. Accordingly, in considering the
bases of individual rights claims in extradition and abduction, we
might inquire into whether or not there is a more direct method of
insuring these conditions. Further, we might inquire into whether or
not the way in which we try to insure conditions make realizing
these conditions more difficult. By arguing that individuals should
have more rights in extradition and abduction, and affirming the
classically liberal division of state from citizen, perhaps we miss the
opportunity to more carefilly scrutinize governmental conduct. And
perhaps by affirming liberal rights discourse, and with it social contract theory, we are legitimating the creation of the international
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social contract, and in the process affirming a legal system which
structurally is unreceptive to individual rights claims.
Rethinking extradition law in the face of an increasingly international world calls upon us to examine how demands for freedom
from physical violence are translated into legal and political language and inserted into the international state system. Access to
this system is not equally available to everyone: states have more
power than individuals, and some states have more power than
other states. Is this acceptable? Can we transcend the ways we have
traditionally tried to insure conditions of liberty domestically and
create a system which does that internationally? The irony of extradition law is that it is arguably playing a tremendous role in setting
the practice of political dialogue between states and individuals but
nevertheless is receiving little scrutiny, both by the courts and individuals. And little scrutiny means that broad questions of legal
direction, which will have great practical impact, are largely going
unaddressed. They are going unaddressed because the judiciary has
not been willing to redefine rights in extradition in light of the
experience of extradition practice or the nature of individual-state
relations. And they are removed from public discourse, perhaps,
because inquiring into the nature of the relationship between the
"people" and government is masked by the perception that abusive
government initiatives only intrude on the rights of others.
VII. CONCLUSIONS

This Comment has demonstrated that there are precious few
protections available to individuals in extradition proceedings. The
justification for denying these protections rests on the form of extradition proceedings, not their substance. Extradition law should be
based on a realistic analysis of the extradition process, both of its
use by the government and its effect on individuals. As far as United
States conduct abroad is concerned, our law rests on jurisprudential
assumptions which should be questioned. Most notable is the assumption that foreign nations will monitor United States conduct,
especially given the political and economic pressure the United
States exerts on foreign countries to gain compliance with its foreign
policy goals. Additionally United States abduction and abuse flies in
the face of increasingly binding human rights instruments. Our
obligations to consider and follow these instruments should not be
dodged simply by limiting the Constitution's extraterritorial reach.
At the last, due process is "that which comports with our deepest
notions of what is fair and right and just." This principle should
enlighten our definition of the right boundaries of governmental
conduct, not political objectives.
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Second, the balance between individual rights and policy goals
raises broad political and legal questions. How is this balance
changing, who is changing it, and what are the effects of those
changes? This Comment has argued that within the tripartheid
context of the Drug War, extradition and abduction, this balance is
increasingly swinging away from the individual. This swing should
be carefully considered, both in terms of its legitimacy and its rationality.
Extradition and abduction law further teach that the formal
rights we have do not tell the entire story about the actual rights we
have as individuals. Rights are constituted by a changing matrix of
constitutional and statutory guarantees, international practice and
international relations. The legal system is currently having difficulty capturing and reflecting on how rights are being internationally defined and altered. Our jurisprudence needs to catch up with
our policy; if the courts and legislature are ignoring consequential
realities in their respective processes of institutional deliberation,
perhaps we need to develop a more penetrating discourse about
rights.
Third, the international trajectory of the policy objective/individual rights balance raises fundamental questions about
the relationship between the individual and the state. If the social
contract which unaerscores our Constitution is being replaced by an
international social contract which is not bound by our Constitution,
we need to inquire into the effect of this contract on individuals. And
we also need to consider the ability of individuals to define this
contract; the lessons of extradition jurisprudence bear out that the
voices of individuals as monitors of international governmental practice are limited.
The ramifications of the Drug War have been great, and are, in
part, setting the legal and political tone for how we solve international problems .3 1 The social project upon us is to analyze what is
being balanced by the brave new world of international policy objectives, and at what cost and benefit. This project, unfortunately, must
begin with some somber reflections about the current application of
extradition and abduction jurisprudence. It must also begin with
reflection on the source and nature of our guiding legal values and
what current governmental extraterritorial practice says about
381. See Thomas VL Franck, United Nations Based Prospects for a New Global
Order, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL., 601, 628 (1990). In arguing that we should seize the
moment to rethink basic processes and structures of the international system, Franck
notes that (1) the U.N. must recognize and defend normative rights; (2) there must be
credible processes for maintaining compliance with those rights; and (3) the international
community must exert degrees of nonviolent pressure, such as the deprivation of the
privileges that the community bestows on legitimate governments.
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those values. All governmental branches, and all citizens, need to
think more carefully about the interaction between law and politics,
its at times hidden impact, and the ramifications of that impact for
the future. Certainly people will disagree on what any balance between rights and policy should look like. But democracy, as our
Nation's history has taught us, can withstand disagreement. What
is important is that the ramifications of our nascent international
policy practice be considered by the courts, the legislature, and the
world community, in the open and authentically. 32 This is internationalization of the most fundamental and forward-looking kind; it is
the multidimensional, cross-cultural reflection on the steps the
world will take together, and the values which will guide those
steps-both now and in times to come.

382. Public knowledge of this phenomenon is not great.
That United States law enforcement officials do roam around the world
(particularly in the third world) making or assisting in arrests and other forms
of seizure going beyond intelligence gathering is apparent. The lawfulness of
such activity has recently aroused considerable controversy in Washington.
Much of this controversy remains behind closed doors, or available only through
incomplete accounts in the press.
Lowenfeld, supra note 36 at 481.

